Property rights and economic growth: evidence from a natural experiment by Brunt, Liam
Discussion paper
SAM 20  2011
ISSN:  0804-6824
November  2011
INSTITUTT  FOR  SAMFUNNSØKONOMI
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
Property rights and economic 




This series consists of papers with limited circulation, intended to stimulate discussion.Property rights and economic growth:  
 
















In 1795 the British took control of the Cape colony (South Africa) from the Dutch; and in 
1843  they  exogenously changed the legal basis of landholding, giving more secure 
property rights to landholders. Since endowments and other factors were held constant, 
these changes offer clean tests of the effects on economic growth of colonial identity and 
secure property rights. The effects of both changes were immediate, positive and large. 
Other legal and institutional changes, such as the move to a common law system in 1827, 
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“Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does 
not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves 
secure in the possession of their property…” 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, book 5, chapter 3, paragraph 7. 
 
0. Introduction. Adam Smith was the first economist to emphasize the fundamental role 
that secure property rights play in stimulating economic activity. At the most basic level, 
Smith argued that secure property rights were both necessary and sufficient incentives for 
economic agents to produce more than they needed for bare subsistence (Wealth of 
Nations, book 4, chapter 5, paragraph 82): 
 
  “That security which the laws in Great Britain give to every man that he shall 
enjoy the fruits of his own labour is alone sufficient to make any country flourish…. The 
natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself 
with freedom and security is so powerful a principle that it is alone, and without any 
assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of 
surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too 
often incumbers its operations….” 
 
Many of the most important insights of Smith’s analysis follow from this basic tenet. For 
example, secure property rights can be achieved only when individuals come together to 
form a society. But a society cannot function without government and thus we have 
rationale for the existence of governments, which we commonly observe in the world. If 
a  government  is to provide security  then it must hold a monopoly on the provision 
internal and external force (i.e. it must have a police and a military). It can maintain this 
monopoly only by being given the power to levy taxes in order to pay for the police and 
military. Yet the government itself could be a threat to personal property rights, since it 
has a monopoly on force, so Smith thus provides us with a rationale for separating the 
executive and judicial branches of the government. Once such a separation has occurred, 
it is feasible for the government to bind itself in law and this in turn permits financial 
development such as the issuance of government bonds. And so the argument is 
developed further and further, with the whole edifice built up from the foundation of 
secure property rights. 
Economists have long been persuaded of the fundamental importance of Smith’s 
insights. But we know that many other factors also affect the level of economic activity 
and it is appropriate to ask how quantitatively important are property rights in 
determining levels of income and economic growth. This has been the focus of a great 
deal of recent economic analysis  and there is now a considerable body of research 
examining the role of property institutions – and the judicial systems that guarantee them  
– in promoting modern economic growth. Prominent contributions to this line of enquiry 
include the work on legal origins by Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei 
Shleifer and Robert W.  Vishny  (hereafter LLSV) (1997,  1998, 1999); the work  on 
finance and growth by Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine (hereafter 
BDL)  (2002a, 2002b, 2004); and the work  on colonial origins by Daron Acemoglu, 
Simon Johnson and James Robinson (hereafter AJR) (2001, 2002, 2003). These papers 
are all in broad agreement: they offer strong empirical evidence showing that secure   2 
property rights – typically measured as an index of freedom from expropriation – have a 
quantitatively important impact on the levels and growth rates of GDP and other 
variables such as the rate of investment. Unfortunately, these studies disagree on virtually 
everything else. For example, AJR undermine LLSV by specifically rejecting legal origin 
as an important cause of the variation in the security of property rights – according to 
AJR the variation is all down to colonial origins. By contrast, BDL support both LLSV 
and AJR by finding that both legal and colonial origins were important in generating 
increased investment and economic growth – but BDL then reject the argument proposed 
by both LLSV and AJR that secure property rights were the primary conduit through 
which this beneficial effect made itself felt, arguing instead that property rights were 
secondary to an efficient evolution of the legal system. 
  Virtually all the evidence presented by researchers in this area has been cross-
sectional. This is somewhat problematic for several reasons. First, there is always the fear 
an omitted variable might be driving the results. Indeed, this is exactly the criticism that 
AJR would make of the work of LLSV, since they find that adding colonial origins to the 
LLSV regressions reduces the explanatory power of legal origins to almost zero. This 
raises the obvious question of whether some other variable (not yet discovered) could in 
turn reduce the explanatory power of colonial origins to zero. Second, there is the 
problem that the cross-section contains only a limited amount of identifying variance that 
we can use to test between the competing hypotheses. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
it is difficult to get data for many countries (the cross-sections generally contain only 
around 60 observations), there are only a small number of legal origins (English, French 
and German) and these are highly correlated with a small number of colonial origins 
(British, French, German, Spanish and Dutch) (BDL, 2001, 30-1 and table 2).  
By contrast, this paper introduces a completely new body of time series evidence 
that  gives us the identifying variance that we need to test empirically  between the 
competing hypotheses. Our study is based on the European colony at the Cape of Good 
Hope, now known as South Africa. The Cape colony (as it was generally known) has the 
exceptional feature that it was a Dutch colony for 150 years and was then seized by the 
British in 1795 for geo-political reasons. Hence it offers a unique natural experiment, 
switching exogenously from Dutch to British colonial origins and from civil to common 
legal origins. It is also useful for our purposes that the change in legal origins occurred in 
two important stages. First, the common law and adversarial trials were introduced in 
1827; and, second, the nature of property rights changed in 1843. All these changes give 
us the identifying variance that we need in order to test empirically between the 
competing hypotheses of LLSV, BDL and AJR. Our construction of an entirely new data 
set on annual output and productivity for the period 1701 to 1875 gives us the data that 
we need to do the job. 
Before considering the new evidence we need to make a detailed comparison of 
the  competing  hypotheses in order to highlight their differences, since it is only by 
focusing on their differences that we can test between them empirically. It is to this task 
that we now turn. 
The  modern property rights literature goes  back  to  Friedrich A.  von Hayek 
(1960), who  stressed the importance to investors of secure property rights  –  and,  in 
particular, legal checks on the ability of the government to expropriate investors. This 
line of argument was taken forward by Douglass North and Barry Weingast (1989). They   3 
argued that it was England’s Glorious Revolution of 1689 which established the primacy 
of Parliament over the monarchy and ensured that investors would not be subject to the 
arbitrary exercise of power. This in turn boosted investment and economic growth and 
led to the British industrial revolution in the eighteenth century. But it was LLSV (1998) 
who really took the analysis forward by offering the first modern empirical investigation 
of the relationship between legal origins and financial structure. 
The basic insight of LLSV is that the legal protection given to investors varies 
very considerably across countries. This stems from both the variation in nominal legal 
rights and the reliability with which those rights are enforced by the courts. For a sample 
of 49 countries LLSV collected data on a range of investor rights and the quality of legal 
enforcement and then took their empirical analysis in two directions.  
First, they show that the variation in legal protection for investors results in 
important variations in financial structure. For example, countries with poor legal 
protection for shareholders tend to have much more concentrated share ownership. 
Second, they trace the variation in investor rights back to the origins of the legal system. 
In particular, they draw a distinction between countries where the legal system is based 
largely on the “common law” and countries where it is based on the “civil law”. The 
common law system is built up organically from judicial rulings on individual cases and 
is essentially derived from English law, transplanted and later adapted in various British 
colonies.
2 By contrast, the civil law system is built upon a rational, idealized view of 
economic relations and the morality that governs them; this view is then codified by the 
executive and handed down to be implemented by the judges. The civil law system is 
ultimately derived from Roman law but its modern incarnation derives from France and 
Germany, whose systems  have been widely influential in other continental European 
countries and the colonies that they created. There is an important difference between 
French and German civil law regarding its ability to evolve over time. Napoleon 
conceived his code to be timeless because it was based on fundamental principles, 
whereas German legal scholars were open to the idea that new types of dispute would 
arise which required evolution of the legal code. LLSV find that legal origin is a very 
important determinant of the level of investor rights in different countries, with common 
law systems offering substantially the strongest investor rights, German civil law much 
weaker investor rights and French civil law the weakest investor rights. 
The distinction between French and German civil law systems is an important 
source of identifying variance that has been used by Levine, working with various co-
authors on a number of fronts. One of Levine’s goals has been to isolate the source of the 
benefits stemming from differences in legal origin. LLSV stress the importance of legal 
origin for the security of private property rights, whereas BDL stress its importance for 
the adaptability of the legal system. BDL (2002a) use four indicator variables to 
distinguish between the two hypotheses. The degree of power of the  State over the 
judiciary is proxied by the length of tenure of Supreme Court judges and by the extent of 
Supreme Court power over the executive. The degree of legal adaptability is proxied by 
whether or not the law is built up from cases (judicial decisions) and by whether equity or 
statute are more commonly used as justification for new interpretations of the law. Using 
                                                 
2 Some of the literature refers to “British” legal origins. In fact, there is a substantial difference between 
English and Scottish law and it was English law that formed the basis of the legal systems of the British 
colonies. Hence we refer to “English” legal origins throughout  this paper.   4 
a  cross-section  of 115 (sometimes 54) countries, they regress financial development 
indicators on the four legal indicators, both separately and together, in order to run a 
horse race and see which indicators win out. All the indicators are instrumented using 
legal origin. The general results are that both adaptability and State power are important, 
but adaptability is more robustly associated with superior financial intermediation and 
has a larger effect. Hence BDL find that English legal origin is the most beneficial for 
economic growth, German legal origin is the next most beneficial and French legal origin 
is substantially worse. BDL (2004) have reinforced their argument by using micro-level 
data to supplement their cross-country regression analysis. 
The literature was taken in a new direction by AJR (2001). AJR agree with LLSV 
that the key to modern economic development is secure property rights; hence the 
variable at the heart of their study is an index of protection against expropriation, which 
they use to explain cross-country variations in economic performance. But AJR strongly 
disagree with LLSV about the nature of successful institutions and what causes them to 
be created. 
AJR argue that the temperate zones were amenable to European settlement, and 
therefore European migrants went there to settle. These migrants demanded –  and 
received – similar social, political and institutional structures to those that existed in the 
home country. Essentially, this meant that the local institutions were fairly democratic 
and effective. By contrast, some parts of the world were inimical to European settlement, 
particularly due to the prevalence of malaria and yellow fever, against which Europeans 
had no natural immunity. Given very high death rates of European migrants, the 
colonizers  relied  on local populations to provide labor. But the colonizers felt no 
obligation towards the local population and therefore set up very extractive institutions, 
such as slavery and authoritarian regimes. Thus the physical endowment of a colony, in 
terms of its disease environment, determined the nature of colonization. These extractive 
institutions, which offer little protection for private property, have persisted to the 
modern period in modified form and continue to exert a negative influence on 
contemporary investment and economic growth. 
  The AJR argument implies that the mortality rates of European settlers in the 
nineteenth century should be able to explain (at least some of) the variation that we 
observe in the effectiveness of modern institutions, which is a very useful property. We 
would like to be able to regress GDP on the effectiveness of local institutions but the 
effectiveness of institutions could be endogenous (i.e. rich countries can afford, or have a 
taste for, more effective institutions). But modern levels of GDP cannot possibly have 
any effect on settler mortality rates from the nineteenth century, so settler mortality rates 
can be used as an instrument for the effectiveness of local institutions. AJR construct a 
data set of 64 former colonies and use settler mortality to instrument for the index of 
investor protection, which they find to be statistically significant and explain a reasonable 
amount of the observed variation. Hence AJR conclude that the physical endowment of a 
colony, working through settler mortality and the institutions to which it gives rise, 
determines modern levels of GDP. 
The really interesting part of the AJR analysis is that they then introduce 
alternative explanations into their empirical estimation, in particular by using dummies 
for both legal origin and the identity of the colonial power. In sharp contrast to LLSV, 
they find that English legal origin has a negative overall effect on GDP (see panel A in   5 
their table 5, where the French legal origin dummy is positive and significant and the 
excluded group is countries having English legal origins). They also find that having been 
a British colony – as opposed to having been a colony of any other non-French country – 
significantly  reduces  GDP  (see panel A in their  table 5, where the British colonial 
dummy is negative and significant; this should not be confused with panel B –  the 
instrumenting equation – where the coefficient on the British colonial dummy is positive 
and significant). These are very surprising results. Various scholars, most recently Landes 
(1998), have highlighted the relatively benign nature of British colonization and the 
superior post-independence performance of British colonies. But AJR conclude that this 
is simply due to the fact that, on average, the British colonized areas that were amenable 
to European settlement. 
The AJR argument has been supported in several respects by Lakshmi Iyer, 
working with various co-authors. Iyer (2004) finds that modern agricultural productivity 
is higher in Indian districts that were ruled by the British, rather than native princes, up to 
1947. However, it turns out that this productivity gap arises from the superior fertility of 
districts that were annexed by the British and it disappears once she controls for this 
selection effect. This supports the AJR argument that the apparent superiority of British 
colonial performance was due merely to selection effects. The question then arises as to 
whether British colonial institutions had any permanent effects on India, as AJR would 
predict. Iyer finds that colonial institutions do indeed have permanent effects but the 
mechanism is different to the risk of expropriation index proposed by AJR. Iyer (2004), 
Iyer and Abhijit Banerjee (2005a, 2005b) and Iyer, Banerjee and Rohini Somanathan  
(2004) all find that there is a persistent colonization effect on the provision of public 
goods. Districts that were ruled by the British up to 1947 had a lower provision of public 
goods even in 1981 and 1991, and this was particularly marked in areas where the British 
had installed a class of landlords to collect government revenues.  
Another important contribution of BDL (2002b) has been to test the power of 
legal origins as an explanator of economic growth against alternative possible 
explanations, particularly the colonial origin view of AJR and the ethnic and religious 
fractionalization views of Easterly and Levine (1997) and Landes (1998) respectively. 
Using the same cross-section of 64 countries as AJR, BDL set out to explain the variation 
in a number of financial variables. They do this using legal origin, settler mortality rates 
and ethnic and religious fractionalization. The basic conclusion is that there is very little 
evidence in favor of the politics view but a fair amount of support for both the 
endowments and legal origin views. Quantitatively, the settler mortality variable turns out 
to be able explain more of the observed variation than does the legal origin variable. 
As a final twist,  Naomi  Lamoreaux  and  Jean-Laurent  Rosenthal (2004) have 
added to the legal origins debate by examining long run time series evidence. Much of 
the debate between LLSV and BDL revolves around the ease with which different legal 
systems are able to evolve efficiently over time. It would seem natural to approach this 
issue directly by considering the degree and the nature of the evolution over time of the 
legal systems in countries with different legal origins. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal take the 
polar cases of the US and France (common law versus static civil law) and consider two 
issues. First, how free were businessmen to choose the legal form of their business (i.e. 
what menu of options were available)? Second, how did this menu evolve over time in 
response to new economic conditions?   6 
  Lamoreaux and Rosenthal find that the menu of organizational options in France 
encompassed that of the US (i.e. French entrepreneurs had available to them all the legal 
forms enjoyed by US entrepreneurs, and more). Also, the menu evolved equally quickly 
in France and the US. Hence Lamoreaux and Rosenthal manage to contradict both LLSV 
and BDL: the commercial law in common law countries offered no obvious channel by 
which it could beneficially affect economic relations, compared to its French civil law 
counterpart. Notice, however, that, whilst Lamoreaux and Rosenthal offer an interesting 
case study in comparative institutional history, they are unable to link their research 
directly to data on economic growth. For example, they do not show that changes in 
French and US law – or variations in the law across the US states – were associated with 
changes in output or productivity, or indeed in the rate of firm foundation.  
By contrast, in this paper we use the historical record to link changes in legal 
origin directly to changes in output and productivity growth. We are thus able to address 
two important issues that are being debated. The structure of our test is summarized in 
table 1 below.  
 
Table 1. Empirical predictions of positive growth factors. 








LLSV  Yes  Maybe  No  No 
BDL  Maybe  Yes  Yes  No 
AJR  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
 
First, BDL and LLSV disagree about the sources of the benefits of legal origin – 
was it the ability of the legal system to evolve or the security of property rights that 
mattered? We find that the rate of growth was unaffected by the introduction of common 
law and adversarial trials in 1827. By contrast, the improvement in the security of 
property rights in 1843 had an immediate and very large positive impact on the rate of 
growth. Hence LLSV are vindicated rather than BDL. Second, AJR and LLSV disagree 
as to whether the disease environment or legal origins were the primary determinant of 
the nature of institutions. Although the Cape colony changed the identity of its colonizing 
power and its legal origins, it did not change its geographical endowment and its disease 
environment. Therefore, in the context of the AJR model of colonization, the nature of 
institutions and the level of economic growth should have remained largely unaffected, 
with a slight negative effect as a result of Britain being the new colonial power. In fact, 
switching to British rule immediately resulted in a significant increase in the rate of 
growth. Changing the basis of property rights from the Dutch legal system to the English 
legal system in 1843 also greatly increased the rate of growth, so that by 1995 (when AJR 
observe the variation in GDP in their sample) the GDP at the Cape colony would have 
been five times higher as a result of the British takeover from the Dutch. Hence LLSV 
are vindicated rather than AJR. Therefore  we find that LLSV emerge as the clear 
winners. First, it was legal origins (not colonial origins) that were the primary 
determinant of economic growth. Second, it was greater security of property rights that 
made the English legal origin important, not its ability to evolve over time.  This is 
consistent with the recent work of Quy-Toan Do and Iyer (2004), which shows that the 
increased security of property rights in Vietnam following the introduction of the 1993   7 
land law rapidly generated increases in cropped area. Our results are also very much in 
line with what Adam Smith would have predicted. 
  In the next section we briefly outline the historical development of the Cape 
colony, from its founding by the Dutch in the seventeenth century, through its seizure by 
the British in the early nineteenth century and up to the discovery of gold in 1867. We 
draw particular attention to the change in legal origins imposed by the British in 1827 and 
1843, considering exactly what it meant for economic relations within the colony and 
how we would expect it to impact economic performance. In section 2 we briefly 
introduce the data set that we have compiled from tax and census returns (a full 
exposition is given in the appendices). In section 3 we analyze the data and reveal the 
marked breaks in output and productivity growth that occurred in 1795 and 1843. Section 
4 concludes.  
 
1. Historical development of the Cape colony.  
 
1.1. Dutch rule, 1652-1795. The Dutch East India Company (hereafter “the Company”) 
was founded in 1602 to exploit the mercantile potential of the Far East, in particular to 
bring spices back to Europe where they could be sold at an enormous profit. The strategy 
was very successful and throughout most the seventeenth century the Dutch had a virtual 
monopoly on the spice trade, becoming very wealthy as a result. But the journey from 
Holland to the Far East was very long and ships needed to touch land in order to take on 
drinking water. Hence in 1652 the Company founded a town at the Cape of Good Hope 
on the southern tip of Africa; this became known as Cape Town and lies in modern South 
Africa. The Cape offered an extremely good natural harbor in a temperate zone (most of 
the rest of the journey took place in the tropics, where disease was a major killer of 
Europeans), along with good watering facilities. Also the land around the town was very 
fertile and in 1657 the Company permitted the Dutch colonists to settle outside the walls 
of the city. The hope of the Company was that farmers would bring the land into 
production and furnish a sufficient agricultural surplus that they could supply passing 
ships with grain, since if each ship carried less grain on its voyage – because it could be 
re-supplied at the halfway point – then there would be more space in the hold for valuable 
spices. 
  The government of the growing Cape colony was very repressive  (Campbell, 
1795, pp. 137-40; Kersteins, 1795, pp. 168-71). The Company literally owned and 
controlled everything – the colony was a private enterprise and the colonists who lived 
and worked there were permitted to do so only by the good graces of the Company. The 
fiscal exactions of the administration were neither equitable nor predictable  (Truter, 
1813, especially pp. 375-8, 382-3, 389) they were merely designed to maximize profits 
for the company.  As Adam Smith noted (Wealth of Nations, book IV, chapter 7, 
paragraph 85): 
 
  “When those establishments [colonies] were effectuated, and had become so 
considerable as to attract the attention of the mother country, the first regulations which 
she made with regard to them had always in view to secure herself the monopoly of their 
commerce; to confine their market, and to enlarge her own at their expence, and,   8 
consequently, rather to damp and discourage then to quicken and forward the course of 
their prosperity.” 
 
It may seem strange that the colony was wholly owned by a private enterprise but, 
in fact, this was normal at the time. The French East India Company owned various 
colonies (such as the islands of Réunion and Mauritius). The British East India Company 
owned virtually all of Britain’s Far Eastern possessions (including Sri Lanka and large 
swathes of India and Pakistan) and the British Government replaced the British East India 
Company in governing the Far Eastern colonies only in 1858 after the Indian Mutiny. 
The Spanish colonies were also privately owned. They were not the possession of the 
Spanish state, they were the possession of the Spanish Crown (as indicated by the fact 
that revenues from the colonies went directly to the monarch). The Spanish 
administrative structure was actually quite similar to those of the Dutch, French and 
British East India Companies. The monarch personally appointed an administrative board 
called the Council of the Indies, which in turn appointed Viceroys to implement its 
policies locally. The only difference between the Spanish case and the Dutch, French and 
British East India Companies was that in Spain the monarch held 100 per cent of the 
shares. This arose quite naturally because the King of Spain had personally financed the 
expeditions that led to the creation of the colonies, whereas the other nations had 
financed their ventures through joint-stock companies. A final example is that of King 
Leopold II of Belgium, who personally owned the Belgian Congo in the late nineteenth 
century, financing its exploitation out of his personal fortune and reaping all the financial 
returns himself. Since the purpose of these colonies was to make money for shareholders, 
it is scarcely surprising that they were administered in an autocratic way.  
If colonies were owned privately by companies and individuals then we might ask 
how the legal origins of the possessor nations could be expected to influence the 
economic development of the colonies, either at the time or later. The simple answer is 
that the owners needed a legal system in order to facilitate economic relations and hence 
economic exploitation of their colony. It was only natural that they would take an off-the-
peg legal system that they already knew very well – that of their home country – and 
transplant it to the colony. Of course, they generally did not adopt the legal system of 
their home country in toto  –  they adapted it to local conditions, sometimes to local 
customs and always to their ultimate goals. This is exemplified by the Company’s use of 
land law in the Cape colony: the land law was essentially Dutch but with a slightly more 
repressive twist. In the seventeenth century there were several forms of land tenure in 
common use in the Netherlands (as there were in other countries, such as England) and 
these different forms of tenure gave the landholders more or less secure property rights. 
When the Company made land available in the Cape colony it employed various forms of 
traditional Dutch tenure but mostly it offered only the least secure form of landholding, 
which effectively completely blocked private land ownership (Duly, 1968, pp. 13-20). 
The most secure form of landholding in the Cape colony was eigendom, which 
was used mostly in Cape Town itself for houses and smallholdings. Eigendom was a 
form of outright  ownership  (i.e. freehold) but had stringent rules attached to it. In 
particular, the owner had to cultivate the land to its maximum capacity, pay one tenth of 
the produce to the government of the colony and allow (without compensation) any kind 
of road building that the government deemed necessary on the land. Violation of any of   9 
these obligations made the land subject to forfeiture. These were unusual and rather 
draconian conditions to place on freehold landownership. The second most secure form 
of landholding was quitrent, which was introduced in 1732. The government leased out 
plots of land for periods of 15 years in return for a rent of 2 skillings per morgen per year. 
The leases could be renewed with the agreement of both parties; if the lease was not 
renewed then the government paid for any land improvements made by the landholder in 
the lifetime of the lease. It is interesting to note that his form of tenure was commonly 
used in English agriculture at this time and has been highlighted, both by contemporaries 
and modern scholars, as one of the major reasons for the success of English agriculture.
3 
Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations, book 3, chapter 2, paragraph 15) argued that: 
 
“When such farmers have a lease for a term of years, they may sometimes find it 
for their interest to lay out part of their capital in the further improvement of the farm; 
because they may sometimes expect to recover it, with a large profit, before  the 
expiration of the lease…. There is, I believe, no-where in Europe, except in England, any 
instance of the tenant building upon the land of which he had no lease, and trusting that 
the honour of his landlord would take no advantage of so important an improvement. 
Those laws and customs so favourable to the yeomanry have perhaps contributed more to 
the present grandeur of England than all their boasted regulations of commerce taken 
together.” 
 
Notice that much of the security enjoyed by the yeomanry (the class of small farmers) 
was based on customs (i.e. precedents that had become enshrined in the common law). 
The long length of the leases and the promise of compensation for unexhausted 
investments gave the farmer good incentives to make investments in the land (such as 
installing drainage, putting up buildings, using long-lived fertilizers and so on).  
Several further points are worth  emphasizing. First,  the  English system was 
considerably better in a number of ways than the Dutch system used in the Cape colony. 
In England the farmers were not holding land from the government but from local private 
landowners; this meant that the farmers had recourse to an independent judiciary in the 
case of any land dispute. This was not true in the Cape colony, where the landowner (i.e. 
the Company) was also the judiciary. As Smith further argues (Wealth of Nations, book 
5, chapter 1, paragraph 68): 
 
“When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that 
justice should not frequently be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called polities. The persons 
entrusted with the great interests of the state may, even without any corrupt views, 
sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private man. 
But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, 
the sense which he has of his own security.” 
 
Second, the English system was superior also because the annual rents varied from place 
to place and time to time, whereas in the Cape colony they were completely fixed at 2 
skillings per morgen. We would generally expect flexible prices to result in economic 
decisions that were more allocatively and productively efficient. For example, 
                                                 
3 British agriculture was extremely productive by international standards – see Wrigley (1987).   10 
presumably there was land that would have been worth cultivating at an annual rent of 1 
skilling but not 2 skillings, so a sub-optimal amount of land was in production in the 
Cape colony. Third, the English system was superior also because it was based on written 
contracts over surveyed areas of land, whereas the Dutch system was based on verbal 
contracts over unsurveyed areas of land. This was open to obvious abuse. Fourth, the 
quitrent system was virtually never used in Cape colony. In 1797 there were only 35 
cases of quitrent tenure out of the tens of thousands of cases of land tenure. Thus the land 
tenure system that came closest to the English system (even though it remained 
considerably inferior in many dimensions) was almost never used on the ground. 
  By far the most common form of tenure offered in the Cape colony, accounting 
for 80 per cent of all the land held by the grace of the Company, was the loan-place 
system. This was a form of annual rent fixed at 12 rixdollars per year (24 rixdollars per 
year from 1732 onwards) plus an annual stamp duty of 6  rixdollars per year. The 
organization and administration of the loan-place  system was virtually non-existent. 
There were no maps of land outside  Cape Town and the land was almost totally 
unsurveyed. An applicant would ask the local administrator (the “landdrost”) to take out a 
loan-place on an unoccupied piece of land. This was very often centered on some kind of 
water source, since water was generally in short supply (Alexander, 1815, pp. 246-7). 
The plot was set out by walking for 30 minutes in each direction (north, south, east and 
west) and placing occasional markers. The resulting area was generally expected  to 
contain around 9 square miles of land (3000 morgen). The local administrator was then 
supposed to transmit to Cape Town the farmer’s request to take out the loan-place, 
although frequently this was not done. Moreover, since there was no land survey and no 
written contract there was effectively no way that the Company bureaucrats in Cape 
Town could make any kind of meaningful registration. The loan-place farmers generally 
enjoyed de facto long term tenure, in that the government very rarely refused to renew a 
lease, but their de jure  tenure was always limited to one year  and this generated 
considerable uncertainty. One of the locals claimed that: “When the Company discovered 
that the farmers grew slack in the payment of their taxes, they without hesitation put their 
property to sale, seized upon their wagons, utensils of husbandry and cattle.” (Kerstein, 
1795, p. 171). Whilst persistent non-payment of taxes would ultimately result in property 
seizure in England, it would be preceded by a lengthy judicial process. By contrast, the 
Dutch farmers at the Cape were extremely vulnerable to direct government action, such 
as immediate eviction, because they were on one-year leases and the government was 
their landlord. 
  An important point to note is that the loan-places were not contiguous. Instead 
they were scattered over large areas in response to topography and local water sources. 
One effect of this was that most loan-place farmers were able to cultivate or graze an area 
that was much larger than that to which they were entitled. Contemporary estimates 
suggest that loan-place farmers typically cultivated around 75 per cent more land than 
their legal entitlement (Duly, 1968, p. 16). There was no one in situ to monitor their 
activities – no government and no neighbors. Hence much of the land that was cultivated 
was held illegally. 
  In fact, illegal land occupation (squatting) was by far the most common form of 
landholding in the Cape colony. Reyburn (1934) shows that in Craddock District in 1812 
only 38 per cent of families had any kind of legal recognition of their landholdings. On   11 
the outer fringes on the colony near Kaffaria only 18 per cent of landholdings were 
legally recognized. This situation arose partly through migration. More and more farmers 
were fanning out from Cape Town in the west and traveling further eastwards in search 
of unoccupied land. After some years –  when the new fringe area was sufficiently 
populated  –  the Company would bother to create an additional official district and 
appoint a local administrator. In the meantime, the land was being held illegally. 
  The irony of the situation was that the Company maintained draconian de jure 
rights over all land because it wanted to have total control over the colonists and their 
produce; the Company wanted to be able to extract the whole surplus from agricultural 
production. But, precisely because the Company was so extractive, the colonists 
continually moved further and further away from Cape Town; the absence of local 
administration in these far-flung areas then meant that the Company had absolutely no de 
facto control over the colonists and extracted very little. The unintended consequence of 
this train of events was that the vast majority of the farmers in the Cape colony had no 
legal right to hold the land that they were cultivating (D’Escury, p. 328). Adam Smith 
presciently summarized the results of such a policy (Wealth of Nations, book III, chapter 
3, paragraph 12): 
 
  “Order and good government, and along with them the liberty and security of 
individuals, were, in this manner, established in cities at a time when the occupiers of 
land in the country were exposed to every sort of violence. But men in this defenceless 
state naturally content themselves with their necessary subsistence, because to acquire 
more might only tempt the injustice of their oppressors. On the contrary, when they are 
secure of enjoying the fruits of their industry, they naturally exert it to better their 
condition, and to acquire not only the necessaries, but the conveniences and elegancies of 
life.” 
 
The prediction that insecure property rights would  result in suboptimal levels of 
investment is supported by the qualitative evidence from the Cape colony. The early 
British observers noted that the Dutch worked the land using insufficient quantities of 
very outdated capital (Gourlay, 1819, pp. 153-60). 
 
1.2. British rule, 1795-1842.  The Company continued to rule the Cape colony 
uninterrupted until 1795, when Britain entered the scene. During the late eighteenth 
century Britain had come to dominate the Far East militarily and politically, gaining 
direct or indirect control over large areas of the Indian sub-continent and diverting much 
of the trade in exotic goods from Dutch to English ports. The British ships used Cape 
Town as a stopover and the British became increasingly worried that if the Netherlands 
supported France in a war against Britain – as they had in 1780-3 during the latter part of 
the American War of Independence – then Britain could effectively be cut off from her 
rich Far Eastern possessions. The obvious solution was for the British to seize control of 
the Cape colony in the event of war, and this is what happened in 1795 after the Dutch 
aligned themselves with the French.
4 
                                                 
4 The Dutch decision to align themselves with the French was not entirely voluntary. The Netherlands was 
invaded by an army from Revolutionary France and the rulers were overthrown, to be replaced by a   12 
  The British were unsure what to do with the Cape colony once they had it. In the 
event that peace was made, it seemed likely that the British would have to return the 
Cape colony to the Dutch as a part of any overall agreement. The Cape colony was one of 
the Netherlands’ most important overseas possessions and it seemed unlikely that France 
and the Netherlands would be willing to sign any peace deal that did not include its 
restitution to the Dutch. (France, too,  had colonies in the Indian Ocean, such as 
Madagascar and the Seychelles, and so would clearly be much happier if the Cape colony 
were safely back in the hands of its Dutch ally). Hence in 1795 the British simply wanted 
to keep the colony as a stopover to the Far East and had no interest in its long term 
development. Moreover, Britain did not want to have to pour military resources into the 
colony whilst it was hard-pressed elsewhere and therefore it was trying to avoid 
antagonizing the Dutch colonists, who had already risen in revolt against the new 
government in 1795. Hence the explicit instructions from the Secretary of State for War 
and the Colonies, Henry Dundas, to the new governor in 1796 were to administer the 
Cape colony “in conformity to the laws and instructions that subsisted under the ancient 
government of the said settlement” (Duly, 1968, p. 23). In consequence, the British left 
the administration of the Cape colony virtually unaltered during their tenure, simply 
replacing the Dutch governor with a British governor who administered the colony 
through the existing cadre of Dutch staff.  
It is worth noting that one of the British governors, Sir George Yonge, strongly 
disagreed with this policy. He felt that major reforms were needed in the colony to ensure 
its future prosperity and that they should be undertaken immediately. In particular, Yonge 
believed that the loan-place system gave insufficient security of tenure and was too open 
to government interference and abuse. Yonge proposed instead that all land be let on 21-
year inheritable leases (as was common in England) and he sent a detailed report to this 
effect to Dundas. In fact, Dundas himself was about to be replaced by Lord Hobart. When 
Hobart later read the report his view was that: 
 
  “Sir George Yonge’s observations on the enormous extent of the loan lands and 
the evils necessarily resulting from the defects of the system according to which they are 
at present managed, appear to me to be very just, and however applicable that system 
might have been in the early periods of the settlement of the colony it must now become 
extremely detrimental to its increasing prosperity.” 
 
But Dundas had already blocked any kind of reforms along the lines that Yonge was 
proposing. One of Dundas’ last acts as Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was to 
recall Yonge to London in disgrace and replace him with Dundas’ own nephew, Major 
General Francis Dundas, who could be relied upon to implement his uncle’s policy of no 
reform. 
  The British expectations about the shortness of their tenure of the Cape colony 
were proved to be correct when it was restored to the Dutch in 1802 by the peace treaty 
of Amiens. Interestingly, the Dutch changed the administration of the colony as soon as 
they retook possession in 1803 (Walker, 1957). By this time the Netherlands had become 
the Batavian Republic and the old (and somewhat inefficient) government bodies had 
                                                                                                                                                 
republican government. The country was then renamed the Batavian Republic until 1806, when Napoleon 
made his brother Louis the new King of Holland.   13 
been abolished. The Dutch East India  Company  went  bankrupt  in 1799 and it was 
replaced by a state body, the Council for the Asiatic Possessions. The Council appointed 
one of its members, Jacob Abraham de Mist, to be Commissary-General of the Cape 
colony. He spent 18 months there and, together with the Jan Willem Janssens, attempted 
to make the administration less repressive. One of his proposals was to change loan-place 
tenure into freehold tenure (i.e. outright ownership on the part of the farmer). De Mist 
believed that this would induce the  farmers to undertake more investment, increase 
production and regenerate the colony’s internal markets (Duly, 1968, p. 37). 
Unfortunately, this proposal had to be scrapped when some of the high-level local 
administrators – notably Van Ryneveld, the Chief Judge, President of the Council of 
Judicature and member of the Political Council – strenuously objected to giving up any of 
the government’s rights over the land. 
In any case, the Dutch reforms were largely moot. War broke out again in 1803 
and the British reoccupied the Cape colony in January 1806. Again, it was unclear how 
long the British occupation would last and the British governor was again informed by 
London that “…the temporary administration of justice and police in the settlement shall 
as nearly as circumstances will permit be exercised by you in conformity to the laws and 
institutions that subsisted under the ancient government of the said settlement…”. This 
state of uncertainty continued until 1815, when the Cape colony was ceded permanently 
to  Britain as part of the peace  treaty  of Vienna. In the intervening nine years the 
administration of the land tenure system had become worse rather than better. The first 
governor, Lord Caledon, realized that the whole system was a mess, stemming both from 
the absence of a land survey (which made enforceable contracts virtually impossible) and 
the nature of the tenures that were granted. He therefore decided to stop awarding any 
kind of legal tenure and instead wrote to the government in London for advice – which 
they took two years to provide. In the meantime farmers simply squatted on the land that 
they wanted to register and started production in the hope that they would be given tenure 
at a later date (Duly, 1968, pp. 36-44). 
  The new governor who arrived in 1809, Sir John Cradock, was in the same mold 
as Sir George Yonge. His great desire was to replace the “inadequate and inferior” Dutch 
civil law system with one based on English legal principles (Duly, 1968, p. 50). As a part 
of this plan he favored granting land in freehold tenure. Prohibited by London from 
making any such radical changes, he instead he decided to make all new tenures under 
the traditional Dutch perpetual quitrent system (i.e. 15-year leases) but with the 
innovation that the annual rents would vary according to the location and fertility of the 
land. This made obvious economic sense and should have improved the efficiency of land 
use.  As well as making all new land grants in the form of quitrents, Cradock also 
encouraged the conversion of loan-place tenures into quitrent tenures in order to increase 
the security of tenure. By 1821 82 per cent of loan-place farmers had applied to convert 
their loan-place tenures into quitrent tenures (Duly, 1968, p. 68). 
Unfortunately, Cradock’s scheme  did not function very well.  In 1814, as his 
scheme was finally coming into full operation, Cradock was replaced as Governor by 
Lord Charles Somerset. At the same time a new Inspector of Government Lands and 
Buildings was appointed, Charles D’Escury, who was very strong-minded and not afraid 
to hold his ground against (what he perceived to be) corruption and vested interest. 
Overall this greatly hindered the implementation of Cradock’s scheme.    14 
First, the rents to be set on new tenures were recommended by local assessors. 
But D’Escury believed that the assessors set the rents much too low and he therefore 
greatly delayed the granting of titles and sometimes simply refused to grant them. 
D’Escury spent 14 years as Inspector of Government Lands and Buildings and made a 
total of 2 061 grants of land (Duly, 1968, p. 73); but by 1824 there were already more 
than 5 000 requests outstanding! At D’Escury’s rate of 150 grants per annum, it would 
have taken him 33 years to clear the backlog, assuming that no new applications arrived. 
Similarly, by 1823 there were 1 300 applications outstanding to convert loan-place 
tenures into quitrent tenures; at D’Escury’s rate of 40 conversions per annum, this could 
also be expected to take 33 years. The interminable application delays once again drove 
the farmers back to a policy of squatting. At the same time, Lord Somerset and D’Escury 
found squatting unacceptable and the law was changed such that anyone who squatted on 
a piece of land automatically had their tenure application for it rejected (Alexander, 1814, 
p. 117-8). Obviously, this compounded the squatting problem.  
Second, after the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815 there was a period of generally 
falling prices which badly affected farmers in the Cape colony and elsewhere. Many of 
the farmers in the Cape colony went into rent arrears and petitioned the Governor to have 
their rents reduced, which would make economic sense if their rents had previously been 
set at market value. However, this process was mismanaged. The Governor and D’Escury 
disagreed over whether rent reductions were appropriate, with the Governor granting 
them against opposition from D’Escury. Notice that this problem was exacerbated by the 
absence of a private rental market for land (which had never developed owing to the 
government’s refusal to sell off any land in freehold). The absence of a rental market 
meant that there were no rental price signals and therefore it was extremely difficult for 
the government in Cape Town to know whether local rent reductions were warranted or 
not. The Governor also made a tactical error. When he granted rent reductions he made it 
retroactive on rent arrears – so farmers had an obvious incentive to go into arrears until 
they could claim a rent reduction.  Finally, the relevant government office was 
overwhelmed with requests for rent reductions and did not have the proper resources to 
consider them on their merits. 
  Lord Somerset and D’Escury both left office in 1828. Thereafter there was a 
considerable improvement in the efficiency of government in general and the granting of 
land tenure in particular. The new Surveyor General, Major Charles Michell, reorganized 
the land department and managed to increase the speed at which it worked, granting 
quitrent tenures for nearly 80 000 acres per annum in the period 1828-34 (Duly, 1968, p. 
132). A further reorganization and some increased staffing raised this rate to nearly 3 
million acres per annum in the period 1835-44. The interesting point to note, however, is 
that there was no correlation between the issuing of quitrent tenures and increases in the 
quantity of arable land in production. In fact, in the period 1835-44 the arable acreage 
was falling rather than rising. This suggests that, even when the quitrent system worked 
and it was possible for the farmer to get tenure, this type of tenure was not sufficient to 
encourage them to undertake arable production, which required investment in fixed 
capital. Instead they preferred to maintain their emphasis on pastoral production, which 
required investment only in circulating capital. 
  A Parliamentary inquiry, analyzing the data available up to 1844, summarized the 
situation very neatly: “The climate, soil, and pastures of the Cape of Good Hope extend   15 
to this extensive colony nearly all the natural advantages; but it has neither increased in 
population, nor prospered in wealth or trade, in the same progressive rate as the distant 
colonies of Australia, or even that of Port Phillip [Melbourne].” (British Parliamentary 
Papers, 1849, p.363). 
  There is one further important point to note about British rule in this period. 
Although the land alienation system functioned poorly, this did not arise from any British 
animosity towards the Dutch farmers and agriculture in the Cape. One the contrary, the 
British had taken to heart Adam Smith’s exhortation (Wealth of Nations, book V, chapter 
2, paragraph 47): 
 
  “The principal attention of the sovereign ought to be to encourage, by every 
means in his power, the attention both of the landlord and of the farmer, by allowing both 
to pursue their own interest in their own way and according to their own judgment; by 
giving to both the most perfect security that they shall enjoy the full recompense of their 
own industry; and by procuring to both the most extensive market for every part of their 
produce, in consequence of establishing the easiest and safest communications both by 
land and by water through every part of his own dominions as well as the most 
unbounded freedom of exportation to the dominions of other princes.” 
 
The British implemented many reforms which could be expected to lead to increases in 
output. They awarded  prizes to farmers who offered  examples  of agricultural best 
practice; they lowered tariffs on agricultural imports into Britain from the Cape (Irving, 
1817, p. 291); they promoted the local Board of Agriculture (Alexander, 1812b, pp. 1-3); 
they  improved the road system (Alexander, 1812a, pp. 251-2);  they  set up a new 
agricultural market (Cradock, Truter and Van Nuldt Onkruydt, 1812, pp. 387-90); and 
they  sought to make the tax system  more equitable and predictable (Truter, 1813, 
especially p. 399).  
The British also reformed the law in several important respects. One of the most 
important pieces of legislation was the so-called “Hottentot Law” of 1809 which gave 
much greater rights to the indigenous population. Although there were many slaves in the 
colony, mostly imported from other parts of Africa, there was also a large and nominally 
free indigenous population. However, the white farmers held all the political and 
economic power and the rights of the indigenous population were greatly circumscribed 
almost to the point of slavery. They had no formal labor contracts setting out their rights, 
obligations and wages and they were also bound to remain in particular localities (which 
effectively meant that there was only very limited competition amongst potential 
employers). The Hottentot Law made labor contracts compulsory and permitted the 
indigenous population to sue their employers for breach of contract. It is noteworthy that 
the British also actively promoted the implementation of the new law by sending a British 
judge to tour rural areas in 1812 to hear such cases. It was also intended in 1809 to permit 
the free movement of labor but this clause was cut from the final draft of the law owing 
to strenuous opposition from the Dutch farmers. Free movement had to wait until 1828, 
when the government also granted complete emancipation of all Cape tribes. Slaves (i.e 
the non-indigenous black population) were emancipated in 1833, when a general Act was 
passed emancipating slaves everywhere in the British Empire.   16 
Another important raft of reforms arrived in 1827. The British introduced the 
adversarial system of court proceedings, rather than relying on an investigating 
magistrate. They also introduced the common law notion that legal decisions should be 
based on precedent as well as statute. Initially, the precedents would be those based on 
local custom (i.e. the Dutch civil law system) but over time the law was free to evolve in 
response to new situations. These reforms were implemented by a judiciary trained in 
England. 
 
1.3. British rule after 1842.  In the 1820s a British politician, Edward  Wakefield, 
analyzed the economic structure of several of the world’s frontier regions, including 
Australia and the US. Wakefield was particularly impressed with the US land law of 
1820 by which the government alienated land to private individuals (Wakefield, 1829, 
1833). The land was divided into freehold tracts of not less than 80 acres and sold by 
public auction with a reserve price of $1.25 per acre. Wakefield believed that this supply 
of freehold land encouraged settlers into the region and gave them the right incentives to 
invest and create self-sustaining communities. The parallel between the US frontier and 
the British imperial frontier in South Africa and Australia was self-evident: as Wakefield 
put it, “What is a new state formed in the western deserts of America, if it be not a new 
colony?” He therefore proposed the same system for the British empire. This approach 
was recommended by House of Commons in 1836 (British Parliamentary Papers, 1836) 
and adopted in 1839 by the new Colonial Secretary, Lord John Russell. Henceforth all 
land in the Cape was to be sold in freehold by public auction with a reserve price of two 
shillings and six pence per acre. 
  Implementing the auction scheme in the Cape proved to be a difficult and drawn-
out process. Governor Napier and Surveyor General Michell were both strongly against 
the scheme. One reason for their opposition  is that there were still thousands of 
outstanding claims made under the old scheme of quitrent tenures – some of which had 
been waiting 20 years for approval –  and Napier and Michell felt that it was only 
reasonable that these claims should be dealt with before any new system was introduced. 
The colonial government did not have the administrative resources to implement both 
schemes at the same time. A second reason for their opposition was that South Africa was 
not a virgin territory like the western US. As a result, much of the land that had yet to be 
alienated was interspersed with tracts that were already occupied and which controlled 
the only local water sources. Hence these unoccupied tracts were really useful only to the 
farmers who occupied the adjacent lands and it was not clear that any kind of meaningful 
public auction could be implemented. Napier and Michell stalled the introduction of the 
new scheme for four years and continued alienating land under their previous quitrent 
scheme. Ultimately, this led to Napier’s replacement as governor by Sir Peregrine 
Maitland in 1844. Thereafter the auction scheme was implemented for almost all new 
grants of land, as required by London, and also the old quitrent tenures were gradually 
converted into  freehold tenures (the quitrent holders could do this by paying fifteen 
years’ quitrent to the government in one lump sum). Finally, after 50 years of British rule, 
the colonial Dutch system of land holding was replaced by the British system and Cape 
farmers gained freehold property rights over their land.   17 
  The issue  that we need to address is what effect these  changes  in  colonizing 
power, legal procedure and property rights had on output and productivity in the Cape. 
We now turn to an empirical analysis of this question. 
 
2. Data on output and productivity in the Cape colony.  We would expect arable 
agriculture to be particularly adversely affected by institutional problems such as insecure 
property rights, arbitrary taxation and repressive government. This is because it requires a 
considerable amount of fixed investment in items such as buildings, fencing, drainage 
and irrigation. Efficient production also requires a considerable amount of investment in 
capital goods that are movable only with considerable difficulty, such as ploughs and 
reaping and threshing machines. This immobility means that the government can always 
find arable farmers and make them obey the law of the land. By contrast, pastoral 
production in the Cape required no fixed investment at all. The farmers would simply 
round up their cattle and drive them to the grazing areas that were in the best condition; 
the condition of the grazing areas was a function of recent rainfall patterns so the cattle 
herds were constantly on the move. This made it relatively easy to avoid government 
regulations and exactions. Given that we expect the nature of the law and institutions and 
the security of property rights to affect primarily the level of fixed investment, it clearly 
makes sense to look for the effect of legal and institutional changes in the output and 
efficiency of arable agriculture rather than pastoral agriculture. Therefore all of the 
analysis that follows relates to arable production.
5 
The data available for the Cape colony are not particularly good by modern 
standards but they are exceptionally good by the standards of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. This stems from the fact that the colony was a private enterprise and 
the Dutch East India Company administered the territory more like a commercial venture 
than a country. The Company wanted to make as much profit as possible from its colony 
and this required decent bookkeeping.  Since  the Company was full  of bookkeepers, 
skilled labor was not in short supply for this task.  
  The basic data source for the period of Dutch rule (1701-1795) are the annual 
Opgaaf returns, which reported data on most of the important economic variables. First, 
we have an annual population return (which is unheard-of for the eighteenth century) 
broken down into many different categories: European and non-Europeans, adults and 
children, men and women, freemen and slaves. Since the population was initially very 
small and migration was easy to monitor (ships calling at the Cape numbered tens per 
annum) it seems likely that the population data are accurate.  
                                                 
5  There is a second reason to avoid an empirical consideration of pastoral agriculture: the data are 
extremely poor. This is partly because the government did not collect data on the animal population. But it 
is also more fundamental than that. One of the variables that we are going to consider is the amount of land 
in production. With arable agriculture the “amount of land in production” is a concrete concept, whereas 
with quasi-nomadic cattle farmers it is almost meaningless. The Cape cattle farmers used not only their 
own quitrent land but also the unclaimed land around it (i.e. they squatted on large areas of land). 
Moreover, the land that they used changed from year to year in response to annual fluctuations in rainfall. 
If an area of land was grazed only in very dry years, say once every ten years, then does this land count as 
being in pastoral production? What about if the land is grazed only once, ever? Or should we count only 
land that was grazed in a particular year? This latter, restrictive definition would clearly drastically 
underestimate the amount of land used regularly in cattle farming. Moreover, there are absolutely no data 
available on the amount of land grazed each year. Hence it makes more sense to undertake an empirical 
analysis of arable agriculture only.   18 
Second, we have annual data on the total input and output quantities of the major 
field crops – wheat, barley and rye – declared by farmers for the purposes of taxation. 
Output estimates made on the basis of tax returns are, of course, likely to be biased 
downwards and the Company was aware of this fact. On several occasions they made 
more intensive surveys in order to be able to gauge the level of underreporting; they did 
this either by sending inspectors directly out to the farms or by putting an inspection team 
on the road to Cape Town to record the number of wagonloads of grain going market 
(Cape Town provided the only market in the colony). We used both of these sources, 
together with estimates of consumption, to reflate the Opgaaf grain returns and thereby 
offset the underreporting by farmers. A full exposition of the procedure is given in the 
appendix. The main point to note is that our estimates of total output for the late 
eighteenth century are rather higher than previous estimates, which tends to push up our 
estimates of output growth under Dutch rule and reduce our estimates of growth under 
British rule. 
Third, we know the quantity and value of imports and exports of all agricultural 
goods. As with the data on migrants, these data should be very accurate because shipping 
was easily and closely monitored – it was, after all, the raison d’être of the Cape colony. 
The trade data are useful for two reasons. First, once we know the trade balance we can 
estimate how much agricultural produce was available for domestic consumption; we can 
use this as a check on our production data. Second, the Opgaaf does not report the market 
prices of agricultural goods. We have therefore used export prices when valuing outputs. 
  The British were also keen to learn about their new colony in order to better 
exploit it. London was particularly adamant that the costs of the military occupation 
should be met by tax revenues raised in the colony. Unfortunately, the British were less 
effective than the Dutch at collecting both data and taxes. There were no data collected 
during the first occupation (1796-1803) and it is only from 1806 onwards that systematic 
data series are again available. For the period 1806-23 we again have annual data on 
population broken down into numerous categories. We also have data on the amount of 
grain sown and reaped. There are no data on prices so we have simply linearly 
interpolated between 1795 and 1836. 
  The British stepped up their data collection efforts from 1833 onwards and there 
are good data available annually for the years 1833, 1836-42 and 1852-4. These data 
include population (by district) and the acreages, yields, outputs and prices of all the 
major field crops (wheat, barley, oats, rye, hay, maize, peas, beans and potatoes). In this 
period Britain began collecting similar information for large areas of the empire in order 
that London could make more informed policy decisions about issues such as migration. 
It seems that the imperial administrators – many of whom were army officers – took 
these duties very seriously and it is likely that these data are fairly accurate.  
  Unfortunately, data collection seems to have lapsed in the Cape colony after 1854, 
which is surprising because it continued in other, comparable colonies such as Canada 
and Australia. But in the 1860s the imperial administration again stepped up a gear and 
began requiring a decadal census to be taken for the whole empire. In the Cape colony 
the census recorded not only population but also a wealth of data on agricultural 
production, including the acreages, yields, outputs and prices of all the major field crops. 
Hence we have two very reliable benchmarks for 1865 and 1875.   19 
  From the preceding discussion we can see that we have reasonable data on 
agricultural outputs. Unfortunately, we have much less data on agricultural inputs, 
particularly for the years 1701-1823,  which makes productivity estimation extremely 
difficult. With regard to land, for the years 1701-1823 we do not have direct information 
on the acreage in production, only the output of each crop. The best that we can do is to 
back out estimates of the amount of land under each crop by dividing the total output of 
each crop by an estimate of the yield per acre of each crop. Fortunately, the observed 
crop yields between 1833 and 1875 show no trend, either upwards or downwards, so we 
have simply taken the average yield of each crop for 1833-42 and assumed that yields 
were the same in earlier years. With regard to labor, the story is similar. We have 
excellent population returns for the years 1701-1823 but we have little information 
regarding the division of labor inputs between sectors. Over time, the Cape colony was 
becoming relatively less dependent on agriculture and this can been seen in the 
downward trend of the proportion of adult males who were working in agriculture 
between 1833 and 1842. We extrapolated this trend back to 1806 and then estimated the 
adult male population in agriculture by multiplying the data  series  on  adult male 
population by the data series on the proportion working in agriculture. We assumed that 
prior to 1806 the proportion was constant at its 1806 value (76 per cent). With regard to 
capital, there are essentially no data at all available and in consequence we have not 
attempted to make any calculations at all concerning total factor productivity. The data 
situation is summarized in table 2 below. 
 
Table 2. Data available on agricultural inputs and outputs at the Cape, 1701-1875. 
Years  Population  % Males in 
Agriculture 




1701-95  Yes  Estimated  Yes  Yes  Estimated  Estimated 
1806-23  Yes  Estimated  Yes  Estimated  Estimated  Estimated 
1833-54  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
1865-75  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes. For an exhaustive discussion of the estimation procedures employed, see the appendix. 
 
The data constraints mean that overall we can offer reasonable estimates of output 
and acreage (both in toto and broken down by crop) and also of labor productivity. These 
are the series that we analyze in the next section. 
 
3. Legal and institutional changes and economic growth.  There are four  years in 
which we might expect break points to occur in the output and productivity series of the 
Cape colony. The first candidate is 1795, when the British first seized control of the Cape 
and replaced the repressive Dutch administration with a somewhat less repressive (and 
almost certainly less effective) British administration. At this point we might expect the 
farmers to have increased production because they were probably able to hold onto a 
higher proportion of their output. The second candidate is 1814, when the Cape was 
definitively ceded to Britain. The administration clearly became less repressive at this 
point. The British began to replace loan-places with quitrent tenures and were keen to 
encourage the expansion of arable agriculture through improved institutions, such as the 
Cape Town market, the Board of Agricultural Improvement and the Hottentot Law. This   20 
was generally a period when a benevolent regime was operating within the Dutch legal 
framework. The third candidate is 1827, when the British introduced adversarial court 
proceedings and the common law. We might expect output and productivity to rise as the 
legal system evolved to regulate economic transactions more efficiently.  The fourth 
candidate is 1843, when the British implemented the new imperial land policy in the 
Cape and began selling off new land in freehold and converting quitrents into freehold. 
We would expect this to lead to increased fixed capital investment, such as fencing and 
irrigation, which would bring more land into production. And we might also expect to see 
increased investment in capital that was difficult to move, such as machinery, which 
would increase labor productivity. 
  We would like to test formally for structural breaks occurring in 1795, 1814, 1827 
and 1843. Unfortunately, gaps in the data series preclude such a rigorous econometric 
approach. Fortunately, we will see that the observed changes in growth rates tell a 
convincing story on their own. 
 
3.1. Output growth. In figure 1 below we graph the series on real arable output and the 
quantity  of arable land in production. In some ways  the quantity of arable land in 
production is a better guide to the state of agriculture than output. Annual fluctuations in 
the weather drive a wedge between what farmers are expecting to happen and what 
actually happens, so the amount of land in production sometimes offers a less noisy guide 
to the level of output that was planned or anticipated by farmers. The disadvantage of 
looking at the quantity of land in production is that it can be a misleading indicator of 
output trends if there is productivity growth. Therefore we choose to present both series.  
It is very clear from the graph that there was a significant jump in output growth 
during the early part of the British occupation, 1795-1813. The annual growth rate of 
output in the period of Dutch rule, 1701-94, was 1.9 per cent (±0.2 per cent with 95 per 
cent probability).
6 But immediately after the British took over in 1795 the annual growth 
rate jumped to  4.5 per cent (±2.0 per cent). Since the British deliberately avoided 
introducing any significant institutional changes, this suggests that British imperial 
administration generated higher rates of growth than Dutch imperial administration, 
ceteris paribus. This piece of evidence therefore runs counter to the AJR argument that 
British colonies performed worse than those of other imperial powers, ceteris paribus. 
There was then a long period of virtual stasis in the Cape colony in the period 
1814-42. In the sub-period 1814-23 the annual growth rate of output was a mere 0.9 per 
cent (±2.3 per cent) and in the sub-period 1833-42 it was only 0.7 per cent (±1.7 per 
cent). This may be explained partly by the postwar depression, which lasted into the early 
1820s, and partly by the problems that the government was having alienating land. 
However, we can also say that the changes in the legal system in 1827 – the move to 
adversarial trials and the common law – did not have any substantial positive impact on 
the rate of growth in its first 15 years of operation (i.e. up to 1842). This undermines the 
BDL argument that English legal origin was important because its basis in common law 
enabled it to evolve more rapidly to fit new economic circumstances. 
The  second  marked break in the series occurred  in 1843. The growth rate of 
output  in  the period 1843-75 was 3.5  per cent per annum (±1.6  per cent), nearly 3 
                                                 
6 We estimate the growth rates by regressing the natural logarithm of output (or acreage) on a time trend.   21 
percentage points above the rate of 1833-42. This is economically and statistically highly 
significant. It is strong evidence that the key to raising national income was secure 
property rights and that this was achieved by switching the legal basis of landholding 
from the Dutch system of quitrent or loan-place tenure to the English system of freehold 
tenure. This result offers strong support to the line of argument taken by LLSV: property 
rights were important and the British legal system protected them better than any other. 
The massive increase in the growth rate from 1843 is obviously a striking result. 
When we made our initial analysis we had the data only for the years 1852-4 (i.e. we did 
not have the 1865 and 1875 benchmarks). Although there was an extremely high rate of 
growth in the years 1852-4, there was obviously a question as to whether this was just an 
aberration and we were therefore somewhat skeptical this result. But the data for 1865 
and 1875 strongly reinforced the result; extrapolating the area of land in production 
forwards or backwards from 1852-4 puts us almost exactly on the observed data points 
for 1842, 1865 and 1875. 
 
Figure 1. Land in production and real output, 1701-1875. 
 
  These data are supported by the qualitative evidence. It is important to note that 
the extension in acreage was not simply an expansion into more remote areas further 
away from Cape Town. In part, at least, it was an expansion into areas close to Cape 
Town that had previously not been cultivable. For example, Noble (1875, 274-5) notes: 
“Half a century ago it [the Wellington area] was spoken of as the ‘granary’ of the Colony. 
Then the whole of the wheat brought into Cape Town, from all parts, did not exceed 146 

























































English pounds sterling)  22 
000 bushels. In 1865, this section of the country alone yielded nearly 400 000 bushels of 
wheat, in addition to 66 829 bushels of barley, 89 784 bushels of rye, 258 559 bushels of 
oats, and 137 548 hundred pounds of oat-hay, besides other produce.”  
Given that the climate of the Cape was generally  excessively dry for grain 
cultivation, the main way of rendering more land cultivable was to irrigate it (Alexander, 
1815, pp. 246-7). Hence the Civil Commissioner for the district of Albert commented that 
in the dry year of 1862: “…no wheat could be sown except by the few farmers who 
possessed the means of irrigating their land.” (Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1862, p. 
JJ25). And the Civil Commissioner for district of Mossel Bay commented that: “The soil 
of the division is very productive under irrigation; and it seems a national sin that it 
should, with others, be almost abandoned to the feeding of sheep and the growth of wild 
aloes.” (Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1866, p. JJ15). 
  But by the 1860s many districts had already installed, or were installing, irrigation 
systems. In the district of Graaff-Reinet:  
“The vast importance of dam making has forced itself on the minds of most of the 
sufferers by the drought; and, in several instances, dams are being constructed at a great 
cost of labor and money, with a determination which must eventually overcome many 
obstacles. One experiment, in particular, at Roodebloem, six miles from Graaff-Reinet, is 
being watched by many with great interest. 
“The principal improvement, calculated to benefit those farmers on whose lands 
dam-making is impossible, is the introduction of several powerful forcing and lifting 
pumps, be means of which water can be forced from wells for irrigating purposes.” (Cape 
of Good Hope Blue Book, 1860, p. JJ30-3). 
In Colesberg, “Each year sees an addition to the number of dams in the division.” 
(Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1860, p. JJ30-3). And in Swellendam in 1862, “One 
proprietor in this neighborhood, has, by means of such dams,… converted a dry extent of 
land, formerly fit for grazing during only a few months of the year, into a productive 
grain farm…” (Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1862, p. JJ13). Such examples could be 
multiplied many times. 
One might ask whether this extension of irrigation after 1842 was simply due to 
the spread of superior technology, such as steam pumps, rather than any increase in 
farmers’ willingness to invest. But, in fact, many of the irrigation systems used traditional 
technologies that had been around for centuries. For example, in the district of Robertson: 
“It has been attempted to raise water from the Breede River for irrigation. Two powerful 
pumps have been erected close to the town, the one for wind and the other for horse-
power. A very extensive price of produce land can be thus brought into cultivation.” 
(Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1860, p. JJ30-3). 
It is also noteworthy that there were other forms of increased capital investment 
after 1842, such as improved threshing and plowing machinery. The improved ploughs, 
in particular, would have made it feasible to bring land into cultivation that had been too 
difficult to work with the older, Dutch technology. Hence in Caledon: “Several reaping 
machines have been introduced. These, when properly understood, will be much more 
appreciated, as tending to lessen the amount of manual labor. In some cases, threshing 
machines are being used with advantage. 
“The English and American ploughs are also entirely superseding the heavy 
Dutch plough.” (Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1860, p. JJ30-3). The Blue Book   23 
contains similar comments about the divisions of Alexandria, Calvinia, Colesberg, Fort 
Beaufort, Graaf-Reinet, Paarl and Picketberg. 
  Even if we accept that there was an increase in fixed investment and a drastic 
acceleration in output growth in the Cape colony from 1843, can we really attribute this 
to the switch from the Dutch system of land tenure to the British system? In many areas 
of the world output was certainly growing faster in the late nineteenth century than it had 
been in earlier periods. Frontier regions were growing particularly rapidly owing to the 
decline in international freight rates, which enabled their agricultural producers to benefit 
from the rising demand in European markets (Harley, 1995; O’Rourke and Williamson, 
1999). One might wonder whether the rising rate of output growth in the Cape colony 
was just another example of this process in operation. In fact, a comparison with other 
frontier regions shows that the growth rate of the Cape colony was exceptionally slow up 
to 1843 and was relatively  fast after 1843: the Cape changed from being the worst-
performing colony in the group to being the best-performing. Table 3 below presents the 
growth rates of output in various frontier regions, as best as we can estimate them. 
 
Table 3. Output growth rates in frontier regions, 1701-1875 (per cent per annum). 
  1701-1794  1795-1813  1814-23  1833-1842  1842-1875 
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c          2.88 
Notes:  estimation of standard errors is possible  only  for the Cape colony; standard errors reported in 
parentheses. The standard error for 1842-75 is particularly large because it is based a fairly small number of 
annual observations. a – data pertain to the years 1706-39, 1739-1844 (which cannot be broken down into 
sub-periods and so is assumed to be constant) and 1844-71. b – data pertain to the years 1833-42 and 1842-
75. c – data pertain to total US output for the years 1839 and 1866-70. All of the data for the frontier 
regions outside the Cape colony are based on the author’s calculations. 
 
  The comparison between the Cape colony and the French colony of Quebec is 
particularly interesting for several reasons. First, the Quebec colony was founded in the 
early 1600s, around the same time as the Cape colony. We would expect the rate of 
output growth to be higher in the early years of a colony’s existence because the volume 
of output starts at a very low base and hence any small absolute increase constitutes a 
very high growth rate. Therefore it is more instructive to compare growth rates in 
colonies of a similar age, such as Quebec and the Cape. Second, there are some fairly 
early data available for Quebec and these show that the French colony consistently grew 
much faster than its Dutch counterpart up to 1842 (with the possible exception of the sub-
period 1795-1813, which the data do not able us to distinguish in the case of Quebec). It 
would be interesting to compare this with output growth in the British North American 
colonies, but unfortunately there are no data available. Third, and most important, the 
British did not change the basis of Quebec’s legal system after they gained permanent 
control of the colony in 1763. They were worried that doing so would generate unrest and   24 
possibly force the French colonists to ally with the turbulent British colonists in what is 
now the US. Thus the Quebec Act of 1774 retained the French civil law system for all 
commercial transactions; only criminal law and constitutional law were rebased onto the 
British system. Therefore we would not expect to see a particular acceleration in output 
growth in Quebec after its annexation by the British – in contrast to the Cape colony – 
and this expectation is indeed borne out by the data. 
  The analysis of the output data has revealed that growth accelerated in the Cape 
colony immediately after the British seized control in 1795. This is consistent with the 
Landes view that British colonization was economically benign compared to that of other 
imperial powers, and it rebuts the contrary AJR view. There was then a period of 
stagnation during the postwar depression and this was not influenced by the move to 
adversarial trials and a common law system in 1827, thus casting doubt on the BDL view 
that the benefit of the British legal system was to be found in its evolutionary common 
law characteristic.  Finally, there was a marked acceleration from 1843 that was not 
simply due to the worldwide acceleration of the late nineteenth century. Instead it was 
caused by the change in the basis of landholding from the Dutch to the British system, 
which increased the security of farmer’s property rights and encouraged fixed investment. 
This vindicates the original argument of LLSV using new time series data. 
 
3.2. Productivity growth. The story on output growth in the Cape colony is clear 
but what about productivity growth? The scarcity of data means that we can consider 
only labor productivity with any degree of reliability but this turns out to be very 
interesting.  Labor productivity boomed after 1842, with the value of real output per 
worker approximately tripling up to 1854. But labor productivity then collapsed and by 
1865 had regained its old level of 1842, as demonstrated in figure 2 below. Given the 
apparently strange evolution of labor productivity, we need to ask two questions. First, 
did this boom really occur? Second, if the boom did really occur, then why? An obvious 
place to look for corroborating evidence of a labor productivity boom is in the real wage 
data, and here we are reassured. The pattern of real wages supports the existence of a 
short-lived boom in labor productivity, with a substantial spike in real wages at just the 
same time as the spike in labor productivity. This is again demonstrated in figure 2.  
 
   25 
Figure 2. Labor productivity and the real wage, 1701-1875. 
 
In seeking to explain the boom it is interesting to make a breakdown of labor 
productivity. One way that we can think of output per worker is simply as the product of 
acres per worker and output per acre. Making this decomposition for the Cape colony in 
the nineteenth century reveals that output per acre was virtually unchanged over the 
whole period. But there was a large spike in acres per worker after 1843; it reached a 
peak in 1855 before slumping back again to its initial level by 1865. This is shown in 
figure 3 below. Notice also that real output per acre and the number of acres per worker 
tend to be inversely correlated. This is for two reasons. First, as each worker has more 
acres to cultivate we would expect him to have less time to devote to each acre and this 
will push down yields (so land productivity will fall even though labor productivity is 
rising). Second, increasing the land-labor ratio generally involved bringing more land 
into production. Ceteris paribus, this marginal land would have been of lower quality and 
this would have put downward pressure on average output per acre. The only period 
when the series move together – rather than inversely – is in the 1850s, when they both 
rise together. This is what we would expect following the improvement in the security of 
property rights. Landowners not only wanted to bring more land into production but also 
now wanted to invest in more fixed capital in order to improve its yield. Therefore, 
output per acre and acres per worker both rose at the same time for a short period. 
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Figure 3. Decomposing the variation in labor productivity, 1701-1875. 
 
The exceptional spike in the land-labor ratio  that occurred in the 1850s is 
consistent with our argument that reforming the laws of land ownership was 
economically extremely important. As soon as property rights in land were secured by a 
move to freehold tenure it became worthwhile to invest in the land. This enabled more 
land to be brought into production quite rapidly. But the supply of labor was inelastic and 
therefore the land-labor ratio rose very rapidly, which in turn generated a sharp increase 
in both labor productivity and real wages. However, this was not a long-run equilibrium. 
High real wages and the increased availability of cultivable land attracted thousands of 
British migrants to the Cape colony, which drove down labor productivity and real wages 
to a more sustainable level. This is illustrated in figure 4 below, where the series on land 
in production jumps after 1842, a decade before the jumps in total population and the 
number of agricultural workers. It is important to be clear on this point. The acreage in 
production was not responding to an increase in population; the population was 
responding (up to 1865, at least) to the increase in acreage. In fact, there was also an 
unanticipated positive shock that substantially boosted the population of the Cape colony 
after 1865: the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886. But these events 
fortuitously followed the increase in the Cape’s ability to feed itself, rather than led it. 
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Figure 4. Population, agricultural workforce and land in production, 1701-1875. 
 
  The data on labor productivity are consistent with our story on output growth. So 
are the data on land productivity, although the high year-on-year yield fluctuations make 
it impossible to draw firm conclusions. The main arable crop in terms of volume and 
value was wheat. Wheat yields averaged around 6 bushels per acre in the period 1833-42, 
which was extremely low by international standards. Wheat yields climbed to 7 bushels 
per acre in 1865 and 9 bushels per acre in 1875; this is what we would expect to see in 
response to the spread of irrigation and other fixed capital equipment. It would be 
interesting to complete the picture with data on capital and total factor productivity but, 
unfortunately, data limitations prevent such an exercise. 
 
4. Conclusions. At three points in time there were important, discrete and exogenous 
changes in the colonial and institutional basis of the Cape colony in southern Africa. In 
1795  Britain replaced Holland as the colonial power, whilst maintaining Dutch 
institutions and customs; in 1827 the British system of adversarial and common law 
justice was introduced; and  in 1843 property rights in land were made more secure. 
Throughout this period the geographical endowment, notably in terms of the disease 
environment, was held constant. This identifying variance has enabled us to undertake 
time series tests of the effects on economic growth of legal origins and the security of 
property rights (as proposed by LLSV), legal origins and the evolution of legal systems 
(as proposed by BDL), and endowments and colonial origins (as proposed by AJR). 
  We find that improving the security of property rights in land had an immediate, 
positive and large effect on the rate of growth of output and productivity – just as LLSV 
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would predict and just as Adam  Smith  was arguing back in 1776. After the 
transformation of property rights the Cape changed from being the worst-performing 
colony to being the best-performing colony in terms of economic growth. By contrast, we 
find that improving the ability of the legal system to evolve by switching to a common 
law system had no effect on the rate of economic growth – contrary to the predictions of 
BDL. We find that changing the colonial power from Holland to Britain had an 
immediate, positive and large effect on the rate of growth of output – contrary to the 
predictions of AJR. Our finding that better or worse institutions can be introduced into a 
particular colony (that is, we can change the identity of the colonial power from Holland 
to Britain and we can improve the security of property rights in land, and both of these 
have an immediate and positive effect on economic growth)  suggests  that  the link 
between geographical endowment and the quality of institutions is not robust – contrary 
to the predictions of AJR. The growth trajectory of the Cape colony changed very rapidly 
following changes in its institutional base. This suggests that modern developing 
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Appendix 1. The population of the Cape colony. Van Duin and Ross transcribed the 
Opgaaf census returns of the Dutch East India Company. They report population data 
from 1701 onwards, broken down by district and type of person (male/female, 
adult/juvenile, white/black, freeman/slave).
7 I have not been able to verify directly the 
accuracy of the transcription, since I do not read Dutch and have not consulted the 
original sources, but Van Duin and Ross seem to have taken reasonable care in 
transcribing the data. For example, they explain that some individual entries have been 
corrected because they appear to be slips of the pen. However, the handling of the data 
after transcription does not appear to have been as thorough and transparent as one might 
like, and here I note four caveats. 
  First, Van Duin and Ross appear to have made many arithmetic errors in adding 
up the data. When I entered the district-level data and tried to match my population totals 
with that of Van Duin and Ross there was usually a discrepancy of several hundred 
persons out of a total of around 30 000 persons. Second, it is difficult to work out to what 
the data actually refer because the titles of the tables provided by Van Duin and Ross are 
rather misleading. For example, table 1 in appendix 2 bears the legend “Population, total 
Cape Colony”. But it turns out that this total does not include the East India Company 
Establishment (i.e. Company personnel), nor their families and personal slaves, nor the 
East India Company slaves. In that sense, it is a rather unusual concept of ‘total’. Third, 
there appears to be no data at all concerning the families and personal slaves of the East 
India Company Establishment. The East India Company Establishment itself is accounted 
separately and does not enter into the total for the Cape district; the implication of 
footnote 1 on p. 126 is that the families and personal slaves of the Company 
Establishment did not enter into the total for the Cape district either. Since the families 
and personal slaves are not accounted separately anywhere else, this implies that they are 
completely missing from the enumeration. After 1730 the Company Establishment was 
never less than 1 000 people, and after 1781 rarely less than 2 000 people. If each 
Company employee had, say, four other people in his household then this would imply an 
under-enumeration of 4 000 to 8 000 persons out of a total population of 25 000 to 40 
000. This error is therefore quite substantial. Fourth, the data for all types of person are 
missing for a number of years, such as 1761, 1771, 1781 1794 and a few others; and the 
data for free blacks are completely missing prior to 1720 and after 1773. 
  I have therefore treated the data as follows. First, the data for missing years have 
been linearly interpolated. Second, the population totals for free blacks have been linearly 
extrapolated prior to 1720 and after 1773 (a regression reveals that a linear trend of an 
increase of 3 persons per annum provides a very good fit of the data from 1720 to 1773). 
Third, I have multiplied the figures on Company Establishment by five to compensate for 
the absence of their households from the enumeration data. I arrived at the estimate of 
four unenumerated persons per household as follows. Over the period 1701-95 the ratio 
of white women and children to white men in the Cape district averaged 2.45; we can 
interpret this (somewhat simplistically) as one wife and 1.45 children per male. I assume 
that the average family structure of Company Establishment men was the same as other 
households in Cape district. I then added on a rather arbitrary 1.55 slaves per household, 
giving a total of four unenumerated persons. With some care and persistence it would 
probably be possible to improve upon this estimate by looking at the documentary 
                                                 
7 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, pp. 112-26.   30 
sources about particular families in the period, but this is rather beyond the scope of the 
present paper.  
The British continued with the Dutch model of an annual census once they had 
established themselves in power, and for the period 1806-23 these census returns are 
reproduced in the Records of the Cape Colony.
8 British efforts thereafter became more 
sporadic; whilst there was good coverage in the period 1833-42, we are reduced to 
approximately quinquennial observations in the period 1847-75.
9 It is also important to 
get a breakdown of the total population by sex in order to generate a more precise 
estimate of total labor inputs. Whilst modern populations in the developed economies are 
split approximately equally between men and women – with slightly more women than 
men, owing to their greater longevity –  this was definitely not the case in frontier 
societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Adult males were more likely to 
migrate and survive and the proportion of males in the total population was therefore 
typically much higher than one half. My estimates of both  the total and the male 
populations of the Cape colony are reported in table A1 below. 
  We need one more piece of information in order to calculate  agricultural 
productivity: the proportion of the population working in agriculture. Data on occupation 
is considerably more difficult to find that data on population. Moreover, since we are 
concerned only with arable agriculture, we would ideally like to split up the agricultural 
workforce into arable and pastoral workers. We would also like to split up the 
agricultural workforce into males and females because the labor input of a female is 
generally reckoned to have been only two-thirds of that of a male. (This is plausible, 
given the heavy physical element of agricultural work at this time, although the precise 
fraction of two-thirds is simply a crude estimate based on the ratio of male to female 
wages). I have tackled this problem as follows. 
First,  I assume for simplicity that all arable workers were males and that all 
pastoral workers were females. This is a crude assumption but captures the basic fact that 
many of the tasks of pastoral agriculture were undertaken by women (such as dairy work 
and much of the herding), whereas the major arable tasks were typically the preserve of 
men (plowing, reaping, carting). Since I am interested only in arable productivity in this 
analysis, I can therefore content myself with estimating the total number of adult males 
employed in agriculture.  
Second, from 1856 onwards we have direct evidence from the census of the 
number of workers in arable agriculture.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Theal, Records, vol. 6, p. 75, p. 248, p. 442; vol. 7, p. 239, p. 477; vol. 8, p. 233; vol. 9, p. 48, p. 299; vol. 
10, p. 228; vol. 11, p. 51, p. 238, pp. 438-9; vol. 12, pp. 128-9, pp. 414-5; vol. 13, pp. 354-5; vol. 14, pp. 
246-7; vol. 15, pp. 198-9; vol. 16, pp. 488-9. 
9 British Parliamentary Papers, 1836, vol. 46, pp. 638-41, pp. 648-9; 1839, vol. 45, pp. 747-7; 1840, vol. 
43, pp. 622-3, pp. 630-3; 1844, vol. 1846, pp. 405-7, pp. 410-13; 1849, vol. 52, p. 359; 1857, vol. 40, p. 
293, pp. 300-1; 1859 (session 2), vol. 31, p. 402; Government of the Cape of Good Hope, Census of 1865; 
Census of 1875.   31 
Table A1. Population of the Cape Colony, 1701-1875. 
Year  Total  Males  Agric  Year  Total  Males  Agric  Year  Total  Males  Agric 
1701  5481  2492  1903  1752  19636  9492  7248  1803       
1702  5925  2657  2029  1753  19900  9970  7613  1804       
1703  5953  2726  2081  1754  20531  10261  7836  1805       
1704  5978  2770  2115  1755  20781  10298  7864  1806  76855  43004  28438 
1705  6034  2870  2191  1756  18159  9395  7174  1807  73482  41639  27379 
1706  6012  2852  2178  1757  19698  9823  7501  1808  73873  42147  29412 
1707  6091  2933  2240  1758  19769  9907  7565  1809  75538  42477  29427 
1708  6261  3054  2332  1759  19918  10268  7841  1810  80443  44972  30928 
1709  7470  3656  2792  1760  20462  10607  8100  1811  87018  48278  32958 
1710  7651  3757  2869  1761  21017  10934  8349  1812  81964  45249  30661 
1711  8017  3758  2870  1762  20923  11080  8461  1813  84373  46888  31534 
1712  7649  3761  2872  1763  21805  11592  8852  1814  84657  47105  31442 
1713  7649  3890  2970  1764  23756  12219  9331  1815  85739  46795  30998 
1714  7395  3631  2773  1765  23532  12447  9505  1816  88486  48461  31390 
1715  8003  3830  2925  1766  25098  12910  9858  1817  97535  53200  32682 
1716  8511  4295  3279  1767  24629  12727  9719  1818  98844  54318  33570 
1717  8947  4533  3462  1768  24892  12890  9843  1819  101657  55478  33348 
1718  9097  4597  3510  1769  25530  13041  9958  1820  105356  57104  34126 
1719  9224  4732  3613  1770  25905  13168  10055  1821  112147  60414  35524 
1720  9271  4633  3538  1771  26804  13509  10316  1822  111451  60086  35200 
1721  9341  4682  3575  1772  27923  13869  10591  1823  116204  62617  36617 
1722  9688  4832  3690  1773  29276  14352  10960  1824       
1723  10095  5174  3951  1774  29908  14577  11131  1825       
1724  10548  5490  4192  1775  29738  14742  11257  1826       
1725  10585  5790  4421  1776  30368  15254  11648  1827       
1726  11198  6057  4625  1777  30543  15757  12032  1828       
1727  12563  6545  4998  1778  30389  16056  12261  1829       
1728  12366  6449  4925  1779  31748  16932  12929  1830       
1729  12078  6350  4849  1780  31867  16846  12864  1831       
1730  12489  6507  4969  1781  32302  16851  12867  1832       
1731  13261  5926  4525  1782  34052  17066  13032  1833  145042  75599  43193 
1732  13511  6970  5322  1783  33773  17277  13193  1834       
1733  13225  7148  5458  1784  34943  18164  13870  1835       
1734  14767  7576  5785  1785  36611  18682  14266  1836  150110  76987  43398 
1735  15130  8001  6110  1786  37955  19312  14747  1837  140429  72280  39862 
1736  15659  8501  6492  1787  44308  21683  16557  1838  147341  75485  41417 
1737  15133  8430  6437  1788  44106  20967  16011  1839  143271  73949  40026 
1738  15828  8551  6530  1789  45228  21362  16313  1840  150255  76578  40145 
1739  15448  8423  6432  1790  44664  21391  16334  1841  147021  75028  38056 
1740  16356  8593  6562  1791  43564  21336  16293  1842  159451  82025  40208 
1741  16200  8356  6381  1792  40154  20477  15636         
1742  16825  8870  6773  1793  41272  20601  15713  1847  185000     
1743  15764  8354  6379  1794  42857  21633  16519         
1744  15728  8157  6228  1795  44441  22665  17308  1853  224827  113240  34306 
1745  16332  8276  6320  1796        1854  248625  124431  35578 
1746  16603  8431  6438  1797        1855  234345  118010  31733 
1747  17228  8484  6479  1798  62000      1856  267096    33638 
1748  17427  8535  6518  1799               
1749  16364  8505  6495  1800        1865  496381  255760  73140 
1750  17986  8927  6817  1801               
1751  18346  9126  6969  1802        1875  720984  369628  128600   32 
Third, for the years 1833 and 1836-9 the population sources give us the total 
number of workers in agriculture, industry and commerce in each district of the Cape 
colony. If the total number of agricultural workers was less than 65 per cent of the total 
number of males in the district, then I assumed that all the agricultural workers were 
male. I chose this 65 per cent cut-off somewhat arbitrarily to reflect the fact that many 
males were not adult and the fact that some males would have worked in other sectors. If 
the total number of agricultural workers was greater than 65 per cent of the total number 
of males in the district, then I assumed that 65 per cent of the total number of males in the 
district were agricultural workers and that the remaining agricultural workers were 
women. This enables me to estimate that total number of males working in agriculture in 
the Cape colony in the period 1833-9. This procedure suggests that overall around 56 per 
cent of agricultural workers were male. This seems plausible because I would expect 
female workers to be more concentrated in domestic work and industries such as cloth 
production; it is also consistent with the later census data. 
Fourth, I calculated the proportion of the total male population that was working 
in agriculture in each year in the period 1833-9 (around 55 per cent) and then regressed 
this series on a time trend. This revealed that the proportion was falling by 0.5 per cent 
per annum and the coefficient was highly statistically significant. This result seems 
plausible, since I would generally expect a frontier economy to be gradually moving 
away from its agricultural basis over time. I extrapolated the proportion of males working 
in agriculture back to 1806, at which point it was 76 per cent, and I assumed that the 
proportion was constant at this level between 1701 and 1806.  
Fifth, moving forwards in time, I linearly interpolated the proportion of males 
working in agriculture between 1839 and 1856.  
Whilst these assumptions are crude, I do not believe that it is possible to do 
substantially better given the current availability of data: hopefully the situation will 
improve in the future. We will also see that the general results of this paper are not very 
sensitive to the precise assumptions about the proportion of males in agriculture. For the 
convenience of other researchers, my estimates are reproduced in table A1, where 




Appendix 2. Wheat output. The primary data series on arable output during the period 
of Dutch rule in the Cape colony is that provided by the Opgaaf returns. The Opgaaf 
recorded the output declared by farmers for the purposes of taxation. Since there were 
essentially no independent checks on the farmers’ declarations, we can immediately see 
that the Opgaaf returns are likely to underreport true output – farmers were likely to 
conceal some of their output in order to lighten the burden of taxation. The question then 
arises as to how much output went unrecorded and whether it was constant over time. 
Before constructing a new set of output estimates, it is important to see why the existing 
estimates are unsatisfactory and how we might improve upon them. Hence I begin by 
reworking the estimates of Van Duin and Ross and showing how the errors and 
imprecisions in their calculations lead to a substantial under-estimate of total output.
10 I 
then derive my own, alternative estimates. 
                                                 
10 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, pp. 21-6.   33 
 
Reworking Van Duin and Ross: 1789-95. The Opgaaf records the amount of wheat 
entered for market consumption (which was taxed) and the amount of wheat set aside for 
seed (which was not taxed). There was a third category called ‘Bread Corn’ which was 
essentially on-farm consumption and which was neither recorded nor taxed. The problem 
is to estimate the true values for each of these categories for a particular year or years, 
and then compare them to the recorded values; this will enable us to estimate a correction 
factor for underreporting which we can then use to reflate the official annual returns for 
other years. 
Let us first deal with bread corn. For five years in the early eighteenth century, we 
know the ratio of bread corn to the Opgaaf seed return; on average, it was 4.228.
11 
Following Van Duin and Ross, I proceed on the assumption that this ratio was constant 
over time and that I can estimate the amount of bread corn each year by multiplying the 
Opgaaf seed return by 4.228. Following Van Duin and Ross, I also assume that the 
quantity of seed was underreported by the same proportion as the quantity of marketed 
(i.e. taxable) output. The rationale for this is that the tax collectors would have a fairly 
good idea of the yield-seed ratio, so the farmers would have to underreport the amount of 
seed that they used (even though it was tax free) because otherwise the tax collectors 
would realize that they were underreporting their marketable output. Van Duin and Ross 
then write down the following equation: 
 
Q = a*(TAXABLE + 5.228*SEED)        (Equation 1) 
 
where Q is total output, a is the correction factor for underreporting, TAXABLE is the 
taxable output recorded in the Opgaaf and SEED is the quantity of seed recorded in the 
Opgaaf.
12 
  The error in equation 1 comes from the fact that Van Duin and Ross are also 
multiplying the bread corn estimate by the correction factor, a. There is no reason to 
suppose that the bread corn estimates from the early eighteenth century are 
underreported, so there is no justification for reflating the quantity of bread corn. 
According to Van Duin and Ross, what we observe in the early eighteenth century is the 
ratio of the (accurately reported) bread corn to the (underreported) seed. Hence to 
accurately estimate bread corn in the later period, we need to multiply the ratio that we 
derived from the early eighteenth century data by the (underreported) seed from the later 
period.
13 So the correct equation should be: 
 
Q = a*(TAXABLE + SEED) + 4.228*SEED    (Equation 2) 
 
                                                 
11 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, p. 98. The figures are: 1709, 3.39; 1710, 6.39; 1711, 4.21; 1713, 4.18; 
1715, 2.97. Van Duin and Ross assume that bread corn was three times the quantity of seed corn. I see no 
reason to use a less precise number when a more precise number is available, so I take the ratio to be the 
mean value of the available data – that is, 4.228. 
12 Note that we have 5.228 times the amount of seed because bread corn was 4.228 times the amount of 
seed and seed itself was 1 times the amount of seed: 1+4.228=5.228. 
13 In fact, we will see below that there is good reason to believe that in the early eighteenth century neither 
the seed nor the bread corn were underreported. We consider this issue in due course.   34 
 It turns out that this correction makes a substantial difference to the results. The 
average total output in the first years of British rule (1798-1806), when the output returns 
are believed to have been fairly complete, was 102 812.3 mudden.
14 Following Van Duin 
and Ross, suppose that this was also the true output in the final years of Dutch rule (1789-
95). The average Opgaaf returns for those years was 20 724 mudden of marketable output 
and 3 345 mudden for seed. Then: 
 
102 812.3 = a*(20 724 + 3 345) + 4.228*3 345    (Equation 3) 
 
This implies that a is 3.68. Putting the same numbers into (the incorrect) equation 1 
implies that a is 2.69. Thus my estimate for the marketable output is 76 346 and for the 
non-marketable output (bread and seed) is 26 538. The Van Duin and Ross estimate for 
the marketable output is 55 198 and for the non-marketable output is 47 615.
15 
  Van Duin and Ross present three checks on their estimate. First, they rearrange 
their equation to derive the implied yield-seed ratio, which they take to be: 
 
TAXABLE/SEED + 5.228          (Equation 4) 
 
They then calculate that the implied yield-seed ratio is 9.94; since this is the same as the 
ratio observed in the early nineteenth century (when the British administrators were 
collecting more accurate data), they argue that this offers corroboration of their methods. 
But, notice first that their equation 4 cannot be derived from their equation 1. Equation 1 
actually implies that the yield-seed ratio is: 
 
a*(TAXABLE + 5.228*SEED)/a*SEED      (Equation 5) 
   
Hence their estimates imply a yield-seed ratio of 11.29. Notice second that their argument 
is entirely spurious. Effectively, all that Van Duin and Ross are doing in equation 4 is 
multiplying TAXABLE and SEED by a and then taking the ratio. If we multiply the 
numerator and denominator of any fraction by the same factor, then its value will remain 
unchanged. The correction factor a could be 1 or 1 million and the estimate of the yield-
seed ratio provided by Van Duin and Ross in equation 4 would be unchanged: hence this 
simply cannot act as a check on their estimated value of a. 
  The second check on their output estimate proposed by Van Duin and Ross comes 
from the barrier across the Cape Town road that recorded all movements of wheat. In the 
three years 1792-4 we know that 63 332, 69 695 and 58 893 mudden of wheat went to the 
Cape Town market. Of course, we might suppose that some marketed grain did not reach 
Cape Town (it could be sold to consumers outside the city) and that the farmers might 
have avoided the barrier whenever possible (since they were habitually underreporting 
the amount of grain that they marketed). To the extent that these two causes led to an 
under-registration of grain at the barrier, the average barrier returns of 63 973 can be 
                                                 
14 This is the average of 1798 (110 025 mudden) and 1806 (95 599.5 mudden). Strictly speaking, this is not 
the total output, which was actually rather higher. But it is the total output measured on the same 
geographical basis as the figures in the Opgaaf, which is the relevant consideration here. 
15 In fact, the Van Duin and Ross estimate of marketable output is 62 171 because they inexplicably revise 
their estimate of a up from 2.76 to 3.   35 
regarded as a lower bound estimate of the marketed output. Yet this lower bound estimate 
already exceeds the 55 192 estimated by Van Duin and Ross. 
  The third check on their output estimate proposed by Van Duin and Ross comes 
from the dispensier of the Dutch East India Company. He was the official responsible for 
Company grain purchases in the Cape and a person whom we might suppose to have 
been well informed about agricultural conditions. He estimated that a successful harvest 
would yield 70 000 to 80 000 mudden of marketed grain. This is rather more similar to 
my estimate of 76 346 mudden than to the Van Duin and Ross estimate of 55 192 
mudden. 
  Finally, there is a fourth check that we can make which is carefully avoided by 
Van Duin and Ross, even though they make use of it for the early eighteenth century (as I 
discuss further below). That is, we can estimate total output based on total consumption, 
since everything that is produced must be consumed.
16 There were 31 948 inhabitants of 
the Cape Colony in 1793 and it is estimated that each of them consumed around 2.5 
mudden of wheat per annum.
17 Passing ships, of which there were 128 in 1793, generally 
loaded up around 40 mudden of grain each.
18 And exports in 1793 were 9 679 mudden.
19 
This implies a total consumption of 117 979 mudden. If I take my estimate of marketed 
grain (76 346 mudden) and add to it the bread corn that was consumed on the farm (14 
143 mudden) then I get an estimate of grain production (net of seed) of 90 489 mudden. 
Obviously, my estimate based on the Opgaaf is rather lower than the estimate derived 
from the consumption side. Notice, however, that the 1793 consumption estimate is also 
much higher than either of the output estimates generated by the British in 1798 and 
1806, which average only 102 812 mudden. This suggests to me that the coefficient on 
population of 2.5 mudden that I used in the consumption model is rather high, probably 
because it does not allow for the systematic differences between the diets of slaves and 
freemen. The average estimated European consumption of eight bushels per head applies 
to a free population. By contrast, the Cape colonists seem to have fed their slaves around 
5 bushels of bread grain (which I take to be wheat) per annum and 3 bushels of peas and 
beans.
20 Given that there were 13 842 freemen and 14 747 slaves in the colony in 1793, 
this would lead to an average  per capita wheat consumption of 6.45 bushels  (2.17 
mudden). 
  The first conclusion to be drawn from all this is that my estimate of a marketable 
output of 76 276 mudden may be slightly low but is much more consistent with the 
evidence than the Van Duin and Ross estimate of 55 192 mudden. This implies that my 
correction factor of 3.68 is more appropriate than the alternative of 2.69. The second 
conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the margins of error in this type of calculation 
are likely to be large and that this is not a very satisfactory way of proceeding. This is an 
issue to which we return below. 
 
                                                 
16 Of course, there might be some wastage and therefore we would expect the production estimate to be a 
little higher than the consumption estimate. However, it seems reasonable to suppose that farmers kept this 
wastage to a minimum, just as they do today. 
17 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, p. 25. Note that 2.5 mudden equals 7.43 bushels; in Europe in this 
period grain consumption was generally reckoned to be about 8 bushels per head. 
18 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, p. 127. 
19 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, p. 129. 
20 Anon., “Return”, p. 216.   36 
Reworking Van Duin and Ross: 1701-48. It is only after 1748 that there is a really 
noticeable difference between the trend in exports and the trend in the Opgaaf returns. On 
this basis, Van Duin and Ross argue that the level of evasion was probably lower (and 
fairly constant) in the years before 1748 and then increased substantially up to the late 
eighteenth century.
21 The issue is then to calculate the level of evasion between 1701 and 
1748. Unfortunately, the method that they adopt to do this is fundamentally flawed. 
  Van Duin and Ross take a sample of four years in which harvests were very low 
(1726-7 and 1739-40) and argue that in those years the quantities of wheat production 
and consumption were probably equal in the local market. They then calculate the total 
consumption for these years implied by the consumption model that I used above; then 
they show that this is 1.3 times the Opgaaf returns for marketable output in these years. 
They then take 1.3 as their correction factor for the period 1701-48. This strategy makes 
no sense. First, notice that wheat production must always equal wheat consumption.
22 
Moreover, we have direct evidence on wheat exports. In this situation, there is no reason 
for Van Duin and Ross to restrict their calculations to the years 1726-7 and 1739-40; they 
can calculate consumption in every year and compare it to the Opgaaf returns, knowing 
that on average this will give an accurate estimate of the correction factor. In this sense, 
Van Duin and Ross are throwing away data that they could have used and the accuracy of 
their estimate of the correction factor will be greatly reduced. Second, it is highly likely 
that evasion will be systematically lower in years when the harvest is poor because 
farmers have less to hide. In this sense, the Van Duin and Ross estimate is almost 
certainly biased downwards. 
  There is no benefit to redoing these calculations at this point. However, I shall 
return to this point below. 
 
Reworking Van Duin and Ross: 1749-1772. Van Duin and Ross apply the correction 
factor that they calculate for the  late eighteenth century to all the years after 1772 
(although they do not offer any justification for this). Given a correction factor of 1.3 for 
the years up to 1748, it then remains for them only to estimate the changing correction 
factor for the years between 1748 and 1773. In the absence of any evidence on the issue, 
they simply linearly interpolate so that they correction factor rises by 0.3 every five years. 
This is obviously not particularly compelling. 
 
My estimates. There are three aspects to consider when we estimate an output series: the 
level, the trend and the fluctuations. Each of these elements must be estimated accurately 
if our series is to be useful for economic analysis. Following the discussion above, it 
seems highly unlikely that Van Duin and Ross have accurately fixed the level or the trend 
in wheat output. By contrast, the fluctuations are probably reasonably accurate. Notice 
that the fluctuations in wheat yields (and therefore output) are always large relative to the 
mean level of yields; this is simply a product of the fact that wheat yields are strongly 
influenced by the weather and that the weather varies greatly from one year to the next. If 
the average level of yields is 1 then we find that yields in England in the early nineteenth 
century commonly fluctuated between 0.6 and 1.4. According the Opgaaf returns, the 
                                                 
21 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, p. 25. 
22 Of course, there could be some storage from one year to the next. But farmers cannot build up stocks 
indefinitely, so production and consumption must be equal on average.   37 
level of variablility was the same in the Cape Colony in the eighteenth century as it was 
in England slightly later. This seems to me to be highly plausible and suggests that the 
Opgaaf returns do indeed capture the year-on-year fluctuation in yields. We can now 
frame our problem more clearly: how can we adjust the level and trend of the Opgaaf 
series whilst retaining the fluctuations? 
  Simple logic tells us that the trend in output must equal the trend in consumption, 
since output must equal consumption on average. I will therefore use a variant of the 
consumption model that I developed above to estimate the trend in output. 
  The final issue is to estimate the level of consumption at either the beginning or 
the end of the period.
23 The output calculations that I made above for the years 1789-95 
were not very satisfactory because they did not mesh very well with the consumption 
estimates and they were based on data from 1798-1806, which might themselves not be 
wholly accurate and might not be representative of the situation a decade earlier. By 
contrast, the data for the early period are much more promising, and here we need to look 
again at the years 1709-15 when the Dutch East India Company put exceptional effort 
into collecting output data. 
  I used the consumption model outlined above to estimate annual consumption 
back to 1701. I then divided that series by the consumption estimates implied by the 
Opgaaf returns (that is, the taxable output plus bread corn). This ratio is plotted in figure 
A1 below. Since the Opgaaf returns fluctuate wildly with the harvest, whilst population 
changes gradually, the ratio of the two series also fluctuates wildly. Hence the ratio is 
unlikely to be accurate for any one year but nonetheless is likely to be quite informative 
over a period of years. Van Duin and Ross argue that the data collected in the period 
1709-15 are not obviously more complete that those collected in other years: figure A1 
strongly suggests the contrary. The ratio of Opgaaf to consumption can be taken as a 
guide to the level of underreporting; over the whole period it averages 0.47, suggesting an 
average correction factor of 2.13. But notice that underreporting does indeed seem to 
grow after 1748, as Van Duin and Ross suggest. And notice also that the ratio of Opgaaf 
to consumption was far higher in the period 1710-14 than at any other time.
24 Given how 
thoroughly the Company officials were questioning farmers about what was happening to 
their grain (in terms of market, seed and bread corn), it seems to me quite likely that the 
farmers felt obliged to give returns that were fairly accurate. Nonetheless, the Opgaaf 
returns in those years still came to only 85 per cent of the consumption estimates. Should 
we therefore conclude that the Opgaaf returns were underreporting 15 per cent of output? 
I do not think so: I believe that the consumption model is overestimating output by 15 per 
cent. Recall from above that the 1793 output estimate based on the consumption model 
was 117 978, whilst the output estimate from the corrected Opgaaf returns was only 102 
812. The means that the estimate based on the Opgaaf returns was only 87 per cent of the 
estimate based on the consumption model. Thus the discrepancies between the two 
methods of estimating output are remarkably close in 1710-14 and 1793. Since there is 
reason to believe that the consumption figures are too high (owing to the effect of slave 
                                                 
23 If we know the trend and the level at one end, then the level at the other end follows automatically. 
24 The years 1709 and 1715 were not noticeably different from earlier and later years; I suspect that the 
investigative machinery of the Company was not functioning with full rigor in those years and that the data 
that they collected was therefore rather less accurate.  Hence in the following analysis I am going to 
concentrate on the five-year period 1710-14.   38 
diets on total consumption), I suggest that the most plausible way of reconciling the 
estimates is to revise downwards the consumption estimates. If we assume that average 
per capita consumption was 2 mudden per annum, rather than 2.5, then the estimates 
from the consumption model exactly match both the Opgaaf returns for 1710-14 and the 
corrected Opgaaf returns for 1789-95. 
 
Figure A1. The ratio of Opgaaf to consumption. 
 
I put these three elements together as follows. I take the Opgaaf returns of 1710-
14 as my base level. Then I use the consumption model (now with a coefficient of 2 on 
population) to estimate the underlying output in each year; I reflate this using the Opgaaf 
seed/yield ratio to get gross output and I extract the trend. I apply the trend to my base 
level and then superimpose the fluctuations from the Opgaaf returns as follows. I take a 
nine-year rolling average of the Opgaaf returns and calculate the ratio of the central year 
to the average.
25 I then take my constructed series based on the consumption model and 
the benchmark of 1710-14 and multiply each year by the ratio that I estimate from the 
                                                 
25 I progressively shrink the sample window in the early and later years of the sample in order that I can 















Year   39 
Opgaaf data. In figure A2 below I plot for each year my estimates of total output, the 
uncorrected Opgaaf data, and the Van Duin and Ross correction of the Opgaaf data.
26 
 
Figure A2. Three estimates of total wheat output. 
 
  Figure A2 shows that my output estimates are somewhat higher than those of Van 
Duin and Ross, and much higher than the Opgaaf. The standard deviations of both my 
series and that of Van Duin and Ross are higher than that of the Opgaaf series, but this is 
only because the means are also higher: the coefficients of variation are the same, by 
construction.  
  The data for the period after 1795 are much more straightforward. The British 
seem to have collected fairly accurate data on agricultural output in the Cape colony, just 
                                                 
26 I have added an estimate for bread corn to the Opgaaf totals for seed and marketed output: otherwise it 
would not reflect total output. The Van Duin and Ross estimates for total output are not available in The 
Economy; both table 2 in Appendix 7 and graph III.3 show only (marketed output + exports + shipping), 
and hence ignore on-farm consumption. Thus I have added on-farm consumption to their estimates, based 
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as they did in other colonies such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Hence we have 
annual data on wheat output for 1806-23, 1833, 1836-42, 1853-5, 1865 and 1875.
27 
 
Appendix 3. Other arable outputs. In order to estimate total arable output I need to 
estimate the output of the arable crops other than wheat. The Opgaaf returns give the 
same type of information for barley and rye that they give for wheat. For other arable 
crops there is no information at all available. I now consider each of these crops in turn. 
Estimating rye output is particularly problematic because the importance of rye 
appears to be falling over time. The Opgaaf figures suggest that the output of rye was five 
times that of barley in 1701 (about 2 500 mudden) but had declined to zero by the late 
eighteenth century, by which time the output of barley had quadrupled. If I used a model 
of rye consumption analogous to my model of wheat consumption then the output of rye 
could never fall –  it would have to rise in line with population because I would be 
multiplying population by a constant. Moreover, it is not clear how else I could hope to 
estimate the correct trend, since there was probably a change over time in the level of 
evasion (and hence the correction factor). Although the total output of barley was rising 
over time, it is noteworthy that it too was falling substantially in importance compared to 
wheat, suggesting that using a model based on population is unlikely to really get at the 
heart of the problem. I suggest that the best way forward in these circumstances is the 
following. Suppose that the level of evasion for barley and rye was the same as that for 
wheat. Then the proportions of wheat, barley and rye reported each year in the Opgaaf 
returns would be accurate, even though the levels would be too low. So I can estimate the 
total output of barley and rye by multiplying my estimate of total wheat output by the 
proportions of barley and rye in total grain output, as measured by the Opgaaf returns.
28 
The results of this exercise are graphed in figure A3 below and reported in table A2 for 
the convenience of future researchers. The striking aspect of the graph is the 
unimportance of barley and rye compared to wheat, particularly later in the eighteenth 
century. This mirrors the declining importance of rye in England in this period. 
  The other arable crops that are potentially important are oats, peas and beans. The 
crop returns gathered by the English from 1806 onwards, which are fairly complete, 
suggest that oats were of very minor importance at the outset of the nineteenth century. In 
1806 oats comprised only 4.0 per cent of the volume of output, and the trend was rapidly 
upwards.
29  This suggests that in the eighteenth century the importance of oats was 
probably close to zero. This is supported by two other pieces of evidence. First, the fact 
that oats never appeared in the Opgaaf suggests that the oat crop was not very large – 
otherwise it would have been taxed. Second, the Cape farmers relied a lot on oxen to 
power their farms, rather than horses, and oxen ate grass rather than oats. Hence the 
                                                 
27 Theal, Records, vol. 6, p. 75, p. 248, p. 442; vol. 7, p. 239, p. 477; vol. 8, p. 233; vol. 9, p. 48, p. 299; 
vol. 10, p. 228; vol. 11, p. 51, p. 238, pp. 438-9; vol. 12, pp. 128-9, pp. 414-5; vol. 13, pp. 354-5; vol. 14, 
pp. 246-7; vol. 15, pp. 198-9; vol. 16, pp. 488-9; British Parliamentary Papers, 1836, vol. 46, pp. 638-41, 
pp. 648-9; 1839, vol. 45, pp. 747-7; 1840, vol. 43, pp. 622-3, pp. 630-3; 1844, vol. 46, pp. 405-7, pp. 410-
13; 1857, vol. 40, p. 293, pp. 300-1; Government of the Cape of Good Hope, Blue book for 1874, BB5; 
Government of the Cape of Good Hope, Blue book for 1878, Q8. 
28 I base my analysis on the data in Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, pp. 133-4. In the case of wheat, Van 
Duin and Ross, ibid. p. 33, argue that the “Reaped” category excludes seed and on-farm consumption; I 
assume that this is also the case for barley and rye.  
29 Theal, Records, vol. 6, 76.   41 
demand for oats was likely to be very limited before the British arrived. Extrapolating the 
oat output data for 1806-23 backwards gives an estimated output of zero in 1803, and I 
assume that it was constant at that level for earlier years. The situation for peas and beans 
is similar to that for oats, with the modification that peas and beans seem to have been 
even less important and the first data do not begin until 1833.
30 At that point, peas and 
beans combined accounted for 0.4 per cent of arable acreage. Hence it seems reasonable 
to exclude them from our analysis of the earlier period and assume that the output was 




Figure A3. Estimated gross output of wheat, barley and rye. 
 
 
                                                 
30 BPP 1836, vol.46, pp. 638-41, 648-9. 
31 Note that in 1853 the agricultural returns combined oats and rye, and in 1854-5 they combined barley and 
rye. The combined barley and rye output of 1854 is higher than the barley output of 1853 by 121 381 
bushels; I therefore assume that rye output was 121 381 bushels in every year from 1853 to 1855 and back 
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Table A2. My estimates of the gross output of wheat, barley and rye, 1701-1875 (bu). 
Year  Wheat  Barley  Rye  Year  Wheat  Barley  Rye  Year  Wheat  Barley  Rye 
1701  48950  3923  17468  1752  204816  32101  7835  1803       
1702  54870  3270  19886  1753  198969  18203  4020  1804       
1703  54275  3071  15619  1754  246935  26850  7341  1805       
1704  47142  3617  14257  1755  185382  23658  9387  1806  410116  203403  62461 
1705  40806  1637  11730  1756  168632  25122  4952  1807  352250  155815  74872 
1706  37638  2985  9598  1757  123869  14645  2996  1808  381709  141926  10869 
1707  47436  2774  13079  1758  208530  25519  6594  1809  595136  158190  13236 
1708  60493  1312  18956  1759  164549  19802  5400  1810  369549  165237  15031 
1709  62122  3349  9170  1760  171557  18956  1770  1811  390580  172283  11183 
1710  113840  5700  2656  1761  210548  22113  2962  1812  514166  196296  5861 
1711  69592  6812  3109  1762  183849  20446  2368  1813  403268  172638  7818 
1712  60279  4709  3138  1763  223883  22098  3726  1814  356289  155546  5288 
1713  65026  3821  3811  1764  136105  19950  2328  1815  553877  210813  12913 
1714  60799  2946  1165  1765  118479  23454  2058  1816  558680  231666  13360 
1715  66701  5525  936  1766  314844  42096  1034  1817  443440  202011  15393 
1716  95463  5311  2633  1767  219745  26243  4434  1818  485764  192547  19982 
1717  105009  7759  2251  1768  205968  22181  1961  1819  529310  202973  18633 
1718  94255  4846  1897  1769  186042  19767  120  1820  574889  259592  23746 
1719  73617  5087  1414  1770  192535  18432  719  1821  295045  208834  23401 
1720  56201  5013  1216  1771  205400  20694  66  1822  249969  250233  30725 
1721  66400  7468  1816  1772  259776  26743  2672  1823  415860  392696  109833 
1722  89706  8167  2220  1773  378401  25224  706  1824       
1723  109498  9701  2960  1774  338592  35362  456  1825       
1724  97098  9278  2056  1775  291850  28598  283  1826       
1725  107699  6196  2198  1776  302292  30946  161  1827       
1726  66020  6396  2474  1777  282325  24725  386  1828       
1727  77857  9472  3362  1778  250427  18700  251  1829       
1728  98723  8953  3699  1779  376079  26134  1608  1830       
1729  111340  9230  7491  1780  332607  24448  733  1831       
1730  97939  16789  7564  1781  305032  25961  389  1832       
1731  89741  10780  7258  1782  238693  24118  0  1833  528147  286197  33432 
1732  126459  12215  12978  1783  262325  21413  0  1834       
1733  145353  11123  6308  1784  223558  19667  306  1835       
1734  133986  13276  5848  1785  230227  19598  0  1836  466299  218409  34258 
1735  146698  13287  5132  1786  155170  20869  0  1837  494280  220534  38464 
1736  131983  11396  5667  1787  287816  82371  327  1838  463691  180847  29907 
1737  112365  9814  9504  1788  482355  64504  3762  1839  395329  203323  32010 
1738  110648  13731  7213  1789  299306  53102  515  1840  443454  244500  36471 
1739  81266  7731  6366  1790  317550  72023  317  1841  471804  295718  46653 
1740  102935  26849  6556  1791  345836  31175  702  1842  592054  271983  61027 
1741  227409  19305  13149  1792  203302  7472  4453         
1742  205314  18476  10314  1793  413812  24950  1891  1847       
1743  146836  15422  7664  1794  326214  20481  2020         
1744  119869  13007  3290  1795  335892  22169  2770  1853  864272  302753  121381 
1745  172716  17050  6473  1796        1854  1012488  302753  121381 
1746  189262  14533  7069  1797        1855  994273  278856  121381 
1747  153174  12391  6725  1798        1856       
1748  144002  15543  4956  1799               
1749  99615  15970  3051  1800        1865  1389766  308318  174071 
1750  106517  16166  5168  1801               
1751  148434  26970  7727  1802        1875  1687936  447992  214260   43 
Table A3. My estimates of the gross output of oats, 1803-1875 (bu). 
Year  Output  Year  Output  Year  Output  Year  Output  Year  Output  Year  Output 
1806  28696  1814  136510  1822  242280  1830    1838  187860  1853  725139 
1807  26856  1815  141131  1823  291439  1831    1839  185759  1854  925235 
1808  74229  1816  140831  1824    1832    1840  167063  1855  2308777 
1809  83864  1817  154825  1825    1833  237012  1841  215006  1856   
1810  95982  1818  153688  1826    1834    1842  286075     
1811  84773  1819  183135  1827    1835        1865  433342 
1812  130316  1820  224838  1828    1836  241186  1847       
1813  108448  1821  210141  1829    1837  211535      1875  918494 
 
Appendix 4. Output prices. Price data are more scarce that quantity data for the Cape 
colony in the eighteenth century, which is rather unusual in historical work. Van Duin 
and Ross give both the values and the quantities for a group of arable exports.
32 From this 
it is possible to infer export prices (since the price is simply the value divided by the 
quantity) and this is the approach that I have followed. I  have some reservations 
concerning this approach because is often the case that the level of export prices is not a 
good guide to the level of domestic prices, owing to factors such as a systematic price 
differential between locations involved in the export trade and locations where domestic 
consumption occurred. However, there are two points to note in this case. First, virtually 
all wheat in the Cape was sold in Cape Town and virtually all exports went from Cape 
Town; in that sense, the domestic and export markets were intimately linked and prices 
are likely to be the same in the two sectors. Second, export prices are likely to capture 
accurately the trend in prices even if they do not capture accurately the level of domestic 
prices; this is an important property when measuring changes in output and productivity 
over time, one of our main concerns in this paper. 
  There are two other problems with the export price data. The first problem is that 
the export value data (and hence export prices) are available only in the period 1749-93. 
However, a regression of export prices on a time trend reveals no significant trend; I 
therefore simply assume the price was constant before 1749 at the 1749 level. Whilst this 
will induce some error for any particular year, it is probably quite a good guide to prices 
on average. Notice also that the year-on-year variability of export prices is not 
excessively high, with a coefficient of variation of 0.35. The second problem is that we 
have export values only for a composite category called “All Grains and Pulses”. Thus 
the price that I calculate will actually be a mixture of the wheat, barley, rye, pea and bean 
prices. But I am going to use this as my estimate of the price of wheat (the major crop); 
this estimate of the wheat price will be completely accurate only if the price of wheat is 
the same as the prices of the other crops. If the prices of the other crops are higher or 
lower then the estimated wheat price will be biased upwards or downwards accordingly. 
However, whilst this is a problem in theory, it is not a problem in practice because wheat 
was effectively the only crop to be exported.
33 For example, pulses (that is, peas and 
beans) constituted only 3.7 per cent of the export category of “All Grains and Pulses” in 
the period 1749-93. Hence any biases will be extremely small.  
  The export data do not give any prices for barley and rye, so I estimate them. The 
first price data that we have are for the period 1833-55. I calculated the ratios of the 
                                                 
32 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, pp. 128-9. 
33 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, pp. 129.   44 
barley and rye prices to the wheat price. The ratios have no significant time trend and the 
year-on-year variation is quite low, with a coefficient of variation of only 0.16. Hence I 
simply assume that the price relatives for the eighteenth century were the same as the 
average price relatives for the period 1833-55, and hence I can estimate the absolute 
barley and rye prices from the wheat price. My estimates for each of the price series are 
reported in tables A4 and A5 below.
34 
 
Table A4. Prices of wheat, barley and rye (English d/bu). 
Year  Wheat  Barley  Rye  Year  Wheat  Barley  Rye  Year  Wheat  Barley  Rye 
1749  41  17  20  1789  120  50  58  1829  68  25  28 
1750  47  19  23  1790  39  16  19  1830  69  26  28 
1751  44  18  21  1791  36  15  18  1831  70  26  28 
1752  45  19  22  1792  36  15  18  1832  71  26  29 
1753  45  19  22  1793  36  15  17  1833  72  27  29 
1754  42  17  20  1794  36  15  17  1834  73  27  29 
1755  41  17  20  1795  36  15  17  1835  74  27  30 
1756  41  17  20  1796  36  15  18  1836  75  27.5  30 
1757  40  17  19  1797  37  15  18  1837  93  42  42 
1758  40  16  19  1798  38  16  18  1838  100  54  42 
1759  39  16  19  1799  39  16  19  1839  163  53  56 
1760  40  17  20  1800  40  16  19  1840  103  34  57 
1761  39  16  19  1801  41  17  19  1841  73  29  40 
1762  11  5  6  1802  42  17  20  1842  76  36  35 
1763  40  17  19  1803  43  17  20         
1764  42  18  21  1804  44  18  20  1853  96  48  60 
1765  46  19  22  1805  45  18  20  1854  98  39  53 
1766  40  17  20  1806  46  18  21  1855  90  37  49 
1767  40  17  20  1807  47  19  21  1856  98  42  49 
1768  40  17  20  1808  48  19  21  1857  106  46  49 
1769  40  17  20  1809  49  19  22  1858  113  51  49 
1770  36  15  18  1810  50  19  22  1859  121  56  50 
1771  36  15  18  1811  51  20  22  1860  102  58  76 
1772  36  15  17  1812  52  20  23  1861  120  61  76 
1773  30  13  15  1813  53  20  23  1862  166  70  83 
1774  31  13  15  1814  54  21  23  1863  164  72  87 
1775  30  13  15  1815  55  21  24  1864  162  74  91 
1776  28  12  14  1816  56  21  24  1865  161  76  96 
1777  33  14  16  1817  57  22  24  1866  159  77  100 
1778  36  15  18  1818  58  22  24  1867  157  79  104 
1779  30  13  15  1819  59  22  25  1868  155  81  108 
1780  31  13  15  1820  60  23  25  1869  153  83  112 
1781  30  12  15  1821  61  23  25  1870  151  85  117 
1782  38  16  18  1822  62  23  26  1871  150  87  121 
1783  37  15  18  1823  62  23  26  1872  148  88  125 
1784  36  15  18  1824  63  24  26  1873  146  90  129 
1785  36  15  17  1825  64  24  27  1874  144  92  134 
1786  37  15  18  1826  65  24  27  1875  123  73  100 
1787  39  16  19  1827  66  25  27         
1788  36  15  17  1828  67  25  28         
                                                 
34 Figures in italics in table A3 are estimated by linear interpolation unless otherwise stated. In table A4 the 
prices for oat hay are in d/ton.   45 
 
Table A5. Prices of oats, oat hay, maize/millet, peas/beans, potatoes (English d/bu). 













1836  23  32  46  66  37  1853  48    60  48  54 
1837  41  70  52  74  38  1854  50    61  88  51 
1838  54  109  79  91  60  1855  46    58  85  49 
1839  39  106  85  100  61  1859  67    92  121  86 
1840  34  63  53  89  45  1860  70    77  124  71 
1841  26  62  46  79  43  1861  74    81  111  79 
1842  37  65  55  84  47  1862  62    95  132  83 
            1874  119    110  136  103 
 
Appendix 5. Acreages and yields.  From 1833 onwards we know the acreage in 
production of each of the major field crops. However, we do not have the acreage of 
fallow land (that is, land that is generally in production but is the resting phase of the crop 
rotation). Fallow land is important because a common way to increase the productivity of 
arable land was to reduce the amount of time that it was left fallow by introducing new 
types of crop. Thus failure to take account of fallow land could lead to errors in the 
measurement of productivity changes over time. Van Duin and Ross suggest that land 
was fallowed for two or three years after taking two grain crops, so I have therefore 
assumed that fallow land constituted 56 per cent (=2.5/4.5) of total acreage. From 1833 
onwards we know also the annual yield of each crop. 
  For the earlier years we know the total output of the major field crops but we do 
not know for any of them either the yield per acre or the acreage in production. However, 
over the period 1833-55 there was no significant increase in crop yields and it seems 
likely that the level of yields was similar in earlier years. I therefore assume that crop 
yields in the period 1701-1823 were the same as the average for 1833-42. Dividing the 
total output in each year by the assumed crop yields generates and estimate of the acreage 
of each crop. I then assume that fallow was 56 per cent of total acreage. 
  The data for yields and total acreage are reported in tables A6 and A7 below. The 
acreages of wheat, barley and rye individually can be calculated by dividing total output 
(to be found in table A1 above) by the individual crop yields. Note that the total arable 
acreage  reported below is sometimes greater than the sum of the acreages of wheat, 
barley and rye because it incorporates the acreages of minor field crops such as peas, 
beans and tobacco. Note also that the acreage estimates are excessively volatile. This is 
because the true yield (and therefore the total output) fluctuated a lot from year to year, 
whereas my estimate of the acreage before 1833 is derived by dividing the fluctuating 
output by a constant yield. The acreage estimates are probably fairly accurate when 
averaged over any five-year period, but the estimate for any particular year could be 
significantly out.   46 
Table A6. Crop yields per acre (oat hay in lbs, all other crops in bu). 




Potatoes  Oat hay 
1701-1823  6.18  10.01  5.48           
                 
1833  4.24  7.04  2.58  4.77  4.02  4.49  13.09  97.50 
1834                 
1835                 
1836  4.35  6.12  2.52  6.63  16.52  5.20  44.52  123.26 
1837  6.16  7.45  5.80  5.79  8.94  9.41  11.53  95.87 
1838  5.35  6.06  4.07  6.11  14.16  7.54  19.57  115.79 
1839  5.28  9.46  5.78  5.55  10.91  8.56  40.54  194.81 
1840  6.11  11.39  6.77  5.44  17.06  11.55  21.50  116.88 
1841  6.92  12.90  6.55  7.07  15.05  11.80  21.91  235.45 
1842  11.02  19.64  9.76  9.62  10.68  6.22  17.77  297.26 
                 
1853  5.61  11.26  7.64  6.63  9.23  4.61  13.73  461.42 
1854  6.26  10.86  7.64  8.40  6.36  5.62  11.48  304.27 
1855  6.35  11.36  7.64  20.13  5.68  5.16  15.39  369.56 
                 
1865  6.87  8.92  7.15  4.35  6.50  4.58  14.38  570.85 
                 
1875  8.96  15.35  4.99  8.01  8.47  7.46  41.22  817.41 
 
Table A7. Total arable acreage. 
Year  TOTAL  Year  TOTAL   Year  TOTAL   Year  TOTAL   Year  TOTAL  
1701  25879  1728  39478  1755  76673  1782  92333  1818  439681 
1702  28880  1729  45691  1756  69082  1783  100329  1819  483312 
1703  26867  1730  42542  1757  49625  1784  85947  1820  555107 
1704  23833  1731  38080  1758  84373  1785  88234  1821  370559 
1705  20043  1732  54121  1759  66584  1786  61191  1822  381850 
1706  18317  1733  58016  1760  67454  1787  123450  1823  603173 
1707  23266  1734  54172  1761  82850  1788  191677     
1708  30106  1735  58509  1762  72510  1789  121131  1833  810879 
1709  27138  1736  52945  1763  88016  1790  131946  1834   
1710  43822  1737  47023  1764  54998  1791  133219  1835   
1711  28147  1738  46337  1765  49258  1792  77533  1836  679141 
1712  24295  1739  33942  1766  124527  1793  157059  1837  543184 
1713  26101  1740  46209  1767  87732  1794  124212  1838  547991 
1714  23278  1741  92542  1768  80787  1795  128423  1839  486756 
1715  25913  1742  83146  1769  72233      1840  462964 
1716  37035  1743  60079  1770  74543  1806  359090  1841  464486 
1717  40904  1744  47921  1771  79467  1807  316589  1842  377396 
1718  36188  1745  69379  1772  101696  1808  313565     
1719  28529  1746  75082  1773  143740  1809  446936  1853  1187382 
1720  22090  1747  61319  1774  131422  1810  329438  1854  1247299 
1721  26602  1748  57962  1775  112811  1811  335195  1855  1233988 
1722  35411  1749  41114  1776  117091  1812  435218     
1723  43265  1750  44541  1777  108514  1813  353367  1865  1462074 
1724  38285  1751  63283  1778  95490  1814  334583     
1725  41510  1752  85010  1779  143470  1815  473239  1875  1792570 
1726  26492  1753  78190  1780  126903  1816  483368     
1727  31859  1754  98962  1781  117062  1817  416714       47 
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